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INTRODUCTION
Financial reporting rules adopted by the U.S. Congress in 2010 inad-
vertently exposed an unofficial category of U.S. taxpayer to the world: the
“Accidental American.” An Accidental American is a person who lives
most or all of her life in a country other than the United States, unaware
that she is subject to U.S. income taxation solely because she is a U.S.
* Allison Christians, H. Heward Stikeman Chair in Tax Law, McGill University
Faculty of Law. This research was assisted by a generous grant from the Social Science and
Humanities Research Council of Canada. Thanks for helpful comments on an early draft are
due to Alice Abreu, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Wei Cui, Armand deMestral, David Duff, Maureen
Irish, Michael Kirsch, Ruth Mason, Max Reed, Diane Ring, Peter Spiro, Brett Wells, and
Larry Zelenak; the participants in the October, 2015 Conference on Citizenship Taxation at
the University of Michigan, the 2015 Invitational Tax Conference at the University of
Virginia School of Law, and the 2016 Tax Law and Policy Colloquium at the Allard School of
Law, University of British Columbia; as well as to Jake Heyka for excellent research
assistance.
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citizen.1 Some Accidental Americans are even unaware of the fact of their
U.S. citizenship. Countries that are home to many Accidental Americans
may be insufficiently aware of the implications to themselves of this popu-
lation, even as they accept obligations to assist the United States in carry-
ing out the new regime. Despite being a virtually invisible population in
the past, Accidental Americans are now coming to realize that they are in
a serious predicament as a result of a series of poorly considered tax policy
decisions by the United States and by their own home country govern-
ments in response.
To discover one’s Accidental American status is to wake up to the
shocking realization that one has failed to fulfill mandatory annual income
tax and financial reporting requirements of what one may consider a for-
eign jurisdiction. This occurs even when one is fully compliant with all the
laws in the country in which one lives and works. For the countries in
which Accidental Americans live, and are often also citizens, the awaken-
ing reveals an intrusive anomaly on the regulatory landscape: an extrater-
ritorial claim of a foreign jurisdiction over a significant population that lies
beyond its sovereign control.
Before 2010, it is likely that relatively few Accidental Americans were
alerted by third parties to their status and its consequences, and most gov-
ernments were largely insulated from any obligations regarding the excep-
tional jurisdiction claimed by the United States. Citizenship-based
taxation was generally understood and adhered to by well-advised profes-
sionals who moved around the world, especially within the employ of U.S.-
based multinationals.2 Conversely, the phenomenon appears to have been
virtually unheard of by many individuals who lived permanently outside of
the United States.3 Even today, an explanation of the automatic applica-
1. The term Accidental American is a colloquial one, conceived by individuals who
discovered themselves to be in the position described or something similar. As such, the
definition of the term presented here may not accord with all permutations of the term as
understood in popular consciousness. U.S. citizenship is conferred automatically by birth in a
variety of circumstances, including birth in the geographical territory and birth to a U.S.
citizen parent. These circumstances are discussed infra Part I.
2. See, e.g., Cynthia Blum & Paula N. Singer, A Coherent Policy Proposal for U.S.
Residence-Based Taxation of Individuals, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 705, 717 (2008)
(“Whether overseas citizens are tax compliant may depend on such factors as whether they
are employed by a U.S. employer, their degree of sophistication and financial resources, and
their willingness to be compliant absent IRS monitoring; yet these factors are unrelated to
any consideration of fairness in taxing a particular individual.”). Many “expats” developed
overseas networks and nongovernmental organizations to share experiences and participate
in U.S. political efforts. See, e.g., REPUBLICANS OVERSEAS, http://republicansoverseas.com
(last visited Feb. 9, 2017); DEMOCRATS ABROAD, http://democratsabroad.org (last visited
Feb. 9, 2017); THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICANS RESIDENT OVERSEAS (AARO), https://
www.aaro.org (last visited Feb. 9, 2017).
3. See, e.g., Amber Hildebrandt, U.S. FATCA Tax Law Catches Unsuspecting
Canadians in Its Crosshairs, CBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/u-s-
fatca-tax-law-catches-unsuspecting-canadians-in-its-crosshairs-1.2493864 (discussing the un-
anticipated reach of U.S. tax law to Canadian citizens born in Canada to dual citizen par-
ents). Multiple anecdotal accounts of Accidental Americans may be found at websites and in
social media forums dedicated to this phenomenon. See, e.g., Liberty and Justice for All
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tion and consequences of U.S. citizenship appears to come as a surprise to
those who obtained citizenship by birthright, or who conferred the status
upon their children, without realizing or acting upon it.4
Foreign governments that are tax treaty partners have likely devel-
oped some working knowledge of U.S. citizenship-based taxation over the
years. However, having never been called upon to take any action that
would require more intensive consideration, it appears that foreign tax au-
thorities had, at best, a superficial understanding of the implications of
citizenship-based taxation on their own citizenry.5 This state of broad ob-
liviousness changed dramatically when, in 2010, the United States adopted
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).6
While perhaps aiming primarily at U.S. residents using foreign ac-
counts to hide themselves from the view of the IRS, FATCA is inflicting
damage on many Accidental Americans who were not trying to hide any-
thing at all. It may not have been intentional on the part of its drafters,7
but it now seems apparent that a main impact of FATCA has been to
United States Persons Abroad, THE ISAAC BROCK SOCIETY, http://isaacbrocksociety.ca/ (last
visited Feb. 9, 2017); A Gathering Place for People Fighting FATCA, FBAR, and U.S. Citi-
zenship-Based Taxation, MAPLE SANDBOX, http://maplesandbox.ca/ (last visited Feb. 9,
2017).
4. See, e.g., Lynne Swanson, OMG! IRS Wants Me!, MAPLE SANDBOX (July 10, 2014),
http://maplesandbox.ca/2014/omg-irs-wants-me/
I am hearing more and more reports of people having their OMG (“Oh My God”)
Moment where they are hearing for the first time that they may be required to file
U.S. tax returns. You are experiencing one of the most terrifying, confusing and
disorienting moments that you will ever have in your life. The range of emotions
you are feeling are so difficult to manage that you are having difficulty responding.
Elizabeth Thompson, Baby Girl Drawn into CRA-IRS Information Sharing Controversy,
IPOLITICS (Apr. 14, 2016), http://ipolitics.ca/2016/04/14/baby-girl-drawn-into-cra-irs-infor-
mation-sharing-controversy/ (reporting that the Canadian citizen parents of an 8-month-old
were
astonished recently to receive a letter from the TD Bank where they had opened
an account for their daughter, calling on their daughter to either fill in forms attest-
ing to the fact she was not a U.S. person or risk having her bank account informa-
tion sent to the CRA to be shared with the IRS.
5. The experience of Canadian lawmakers in grappling with an intergovernmental
agreement to implement FATCA in Canada is illustrative. See Charlie Feldman, Parliamen-
tary Practice and Treaties 9 J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 585, 605-19 (2015).
6. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act (HIRE), Pub. L. No. 111-147,
§§ 501-531, 124 Stat. 71 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code).
7. For instance, a lengthy article discussing the rationale for FATCA, authored by a
self-identified insider, begins with the proposition that “U.S. taxpayers have been hiding in-
come overseas for years” without defining the term “U.S. taxpayer” (which is not a defined
term) and without ever mentioning citizenship-based taxation. J. Richard Harvey, Jr., Off-
shore Accounts: Insider’s Summary of FATCA and Its Potential Future, 57 VILL. L. REV. 471,
473 (2012). The article suggests that the direct focus of FATCA was on the use by high net
worth U.S.-resident individuals of anonymous or unidentified accounts in specified countries,
especially Switzerland and Lichtenstein, with the express goal of hiding their identities from
the tax authorities. Id. at 476-79.
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reverse the century-long status quo of unenforceable citizenship-based tax.
Prior to FATCA, citizenship-based taxation imposed nominal obligations
on a vast, globally dispersed population that is not even officially identi-
fied by the United States.8 Accordingly, some citizens voluntarily com-
plied while most did not, with apparently no reprisal for those who simply
opted out.9 FATCA reversed this situation by applying economic sanctions
to compel the assistance of foreign institutions, and ultimately foreign gov-
ernments, in the task of identifying and controlling the population of U.S.
citizens not living in the United States, all under the guise of catching tax
evaders.
This Article contends that, with regard to individuals who reside per-
manently outside of the United States, the global assistance sought under
FATCA to enforce U.S. income taxation solely on the basis of citizenship
violates international law. It argues that insisting upon foreign cooperation
with the FATCA regime, under threat of serious economic penalties, is
inconsistent with universally accepted norms regarding appropriate limits
to the state’s jurisdiction to tax, while also being normatively unjustified.
Accordingly, FATCA should be rejected by all other nation states to the
extent it imposes any obligations with respect to individuals who perma-
nently reside outside of, and have no economic ties to, the United States.10
8. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-898, 2010 CENSUS: COUNTING
AMERICANS OVERSEAS AS PART OF THE DECENNIAL CENSUS WOULD NOT BE COST-EFFEC-
TIVE, 1-2, 4-6 (Aug. 19, 2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04898.pdf (stating that”the pre-
cise number of overseas Americans is unknown,”that counting this population would be “a
monumental task that would introduce new resource demands, risks, and uncertainties to an
endeavor that was already facing a variety of difficulties,” including the difficult and costly
problem of locating and obtaining cooperation from the targeted population and then verify-
ing U.S. citizenship, and therefore recommending that the U.S. Census Bureau not include
this population in the 2010 Census); Frequently Asked Questions: Will 2010 Census Appor-
tionment Population Counts Also Include Any Americans Overseas?, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
https://ask.census.gov/faq.php?id=5000&faqId=981 (“Private U.S. citizens living abroad who
are not affiliated with the Federal government (either as employees or their dependents) will
not be included in the overseas counts.”); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Case Against
Taxing Citizens, 58 TAX NOTES INT’L 389 (2010) (discussing the GAO report and concluding
that “We have no idea how many U.S. citizens live overseas”). The decision not to count
nonresident citizens continues for future census planning. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2020 CEN-
SUS OPERATIONAL PLAN: A NEW DESIGN FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 125 (Nov. 2015), http://
www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial/2020/program-management/planning-docs/
2020-oper-plan.pdf (including within the planning for the 2020 Census only those nonresident
U.S. citizens who are “U.S. military and federal civilian employees stationed or deployed
overseas and their dependents living with them”). The failure to count nonresident citizens in
the census has led to lawsuits in the past, since a principal purpose of including nonresident
citizens in census is to allocate congressional seats to the several states. For a discussion, see
Susanna Groves, Americans Abroad: U.S. Emigration Policy and Perspectives, in DIASPORAS,
DEVELOPMENT, AND GOVERNANCE 239, 242-43 (Abel Chikanda et al. eds., 2015).
9. This conventional wisdom is oft-repeated among tax experts and is implied in ob-
servations about the general lack of compliance with foreign financial asset reporting noted
by Harvey and others. See Harvey, supra note 7, at 473.
10. The legality and justification of FATCA with respect to its impact on individuals
who reside within the United States is beyond the scope of this article. In prior work, I have
argued that it would be appropriate for the United States to request assistance in improving
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To make the international law case against foreign enforcement of
FATCA with respect to individuals whose only tie to the United States is
the accident of their birth, this article proceeds in three parts. Part I begins
by analyzing the population of taxpayers defined by the United States in
law compared to that which it actually reaches in practice, and between
these the phenomenon of the Accidental American. Part II demonstrates
why the gulf between the law on the books and the law in practice created
by citizenship-based taxation is incapable of being closed, barring the ex-
tensive assistance of other states against their own interests and in viola-
tion of globally recognized tax norms. Part III, therefore, rejects the
current U.S. jurisdictional claim as inconsistent with international law. It
acknowledges that contemporary U.S. political reality virtually excludes
the possibility that the United States would adopt necessary legal reforms
in the near term. It concludes that in no case are foreign lawmakers or
courts obligated to accept or enforce FATCA to the extent its effect is to
subject their own residents to U.S. citizenship-based taxation.
I. THE ACCIDENTAL AMERICAN: ORIGIN AND IMPLICATIONS
In a presentation to an audience assembled to discuss taxpayer rights
some time ago, I introduced “Tina,” a Canadian citizen and resident who
is also an Accidental American.11 Tina’s story is helpful for understanding
how it is that Accidental Americans come to be, why their existence repre-
sents both a normative and a practical failure of law, and why enforcing
U.S. claims against them would violate international law. Accordingly, this
section recounts the main features of Tina’s story to explain how and to
what extent FATCA enables the United States to enforce citizenship-
based taxation on those who permanently reside outside of, and have no
economic ties or allegiances to, the United States. It explores how, and to
what extent, citizenship-based taxation continues to be unenforceable de-
spite FATCA, and why international law principles conflict with FATCA
in both design and implementation.
A. Tina’s Story
In brief, Tina12 is a Canadian resident nearing retirement age who re-
cently received a letter from her Canadian bank informing her that, in
tax compliance by U.S. residents with respect to their foreign income, in line with global
standards and on a reciprocal basis. See Allison Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sover-
eign, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1373, 1406-10 (2013).
11. Allison Christians, Understanding the Accidental American: Tina’s Story, 80 TAX
NOTES INT’L 833 (2015) (transcript); see also McGill Tax, Understanding the Accidental
American: Tina’s Story, YOUTUBE (July 5, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0kQ2
AQKiA4w.
12. “Tina” is a composite of individual experiences that have been related to me by
persons sharing common characteristics and circumstances. I have chosen to develop this
composite, rather than refer to the actual experiences of any one individual, both to protect
the confidentiality of those upon whom Tina is based as well as to present the issues facing
Accidental Americans as a group in as accurate and comprehensive a way as possible. In thus
compiling the experiences of Accidental Americans, I have compared notes with cross-bor-
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accordance with FATCA, the bank undertook a review of their files and
discovered a piece of information indicating that she was born in the
United States.13 Accordingly, the Canadian bank sought to inform its Ca-
nadian account-holder that it would be reporting her Canadian account
information to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) unless she could prove
she was not in fact a U.S. Person for U.S. tax purposes.14
Tina was surprised and dismayed by the letter because, while she did
happen to have been born in the United States, it was while her Canadian
parents were exchange students. As a result, Tina only spent the first six
months of her life there. Without a social security number or passport, she
had never voted in an American election, nor did she follow U.S. politics
or legal conventions beyond passing familiarity gleaned from local news
media, and Tina considered herself Canadian all her life. Tina was, in
short, the quintessential Accidental American.
Like many Accidental Americans, Tina then learned from an account-
ant that unless she had at some point renounced or relinquished her U.S.
citizenship, she was a U.S. person with annual tax filing and asset disclo-
sure obligations.15 To her knowledge, Tina had not relinquished or re-
nounced her citizenship. Even if she did so now, she would continue to be
a U.S. Person for tax purposes until she demonstrated five years of compli-
ance with U.S. tax law and undertook certain documentary requirements
for exit.16
der tax practitioners to assess the accuracy of common features and claims. Accordingly, my
account of Tina’s experience reflects an anecdotal perspective of an emerging phenomenon.
Since originally presenting Tina’s story, I have been contacted by several individuals who
assert that they are also in Tina’s situation.
13. Indicia-searching is performed pursuant to I.R.C. § 1471 (2010) and regulations
thereto.
14. Upon the discovery of indicia, financial institutions must seek certification as to
status and report specified information with respect to reportable accounts to the IRS under
FATCA; the reporting is made to foreign governments under certain intergovernmental
agreements. See I.R.C. § 1471 (2010); 26 C.F.R. § 1.1471-4(c)(5)(iv)(B)(2); See Agreement
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [FATCA
Partner] to Improve International Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA [hereinafter
Model 1A IGA], at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/
FATCA-Reciprocal-Model-1A-Agreement-Preexisting-TIEA-or-DTC-6-6-14.pdf; Agree-
ment Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Canada to Improve International Tax Compliance through Enhanced Exchange of Informa-
tion under the Convention Between the United States of America and Canada with Respect
to Taxes on Income and on Capital, 27 June 2014 [hereinafter Canada-U.S. IGA], https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-Cana
da-2-5-2014.pdf.
15. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30) (2014).
16. See I.R.C. §§ 877(a)(2)(c); 877A(g)(4); Form 8854, Initial and Annual Expatriation
Statement; Matthew Morris, FATCA and the Road to Expatriation, 149 TAX NOTES 691
(Nov. 2, 2015) (explaining that under § 877(a)(2)(c), an individual will not consider to have
expatriated until Form 8854 is filed, which requires certification under penalty of perjury of
compliance with U.S. income tax and information return responsibilities for the preceding
five tax years).
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The immediate problem for compliance was that Tina had not planned
her financial life with U.S. tax law in mind. U.S. tax law is complex by any
measure, but it is especially so when applied to what it defines as foreign
assets and foreign income items—matters that are, to many Accidental
Americans, completely local, ordinary, and uncontroversial until the
United States becomes involved.
Had Tina understood that U.S. law would apply to her in advance, she
would have made vastly different financial choices over the years. For ex-
ample, she would have almost certainly scrupulously avoided certain kinds
of plain vanilla pooled investment vehicles (i.e., mutual funds), because
the U.S. taxes and interest charges that apply to non-U.S. forms of these
basic investments typically wipe out any returns and can even eat into
principal.17 She might have even taken drastic steps such as placing all of
her assets in the name of a non-U.S. spouse. Some of these choices would
have disadvantaged her economically or made her financially very vulner-
able. She may have nevertheless chosen them over the more dire conse-
quences attending to her life as a U.S. person. She was never alerted to the
need to make those choices, however, and, by the time FATCA caused her
bank to indirectly alert her to the issues, it was far too late to make
changes without incurring enormous costs.
The reality for someone like Tina is that in all probability, with proper
advice and planning, she would owe virtually no U.S. tax at any point in
her life. This is primarily because she lives in a high-tax country that,
under all international standards and practices, as well as under a treaty
with the United States has the primary right to tax her income.18 How-
ever, proper advice and planning is extremely expensive. It also requires
realizing in advance that one needs legal advice.
Moreover, even if, failing to obtain proper advice, Tina was nominally
subject to U.S. fines, penalties, and interest, she would be immune to col-
lection by the IRS. This is because she is a citizen and resident of Canada
and all of her assets and income are located there.19 Absent an express
undertaking to the contrary (which Canada had never given prior to
FATCA), Canada had no obligation to lend assistance to foreign jurisdic-
tions to collect foreign tax debts in such circumstances.20
17. See I.R.C. §§ 1291-1298.
18. See, e.g., HUGH AULT & BRIAN ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 431-32 (2010); REUVEN AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 28-29 (2007); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay,
Two Cheers for the Foreign Tax Credit, Even in the BEPS Era, 91 TUL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2016);
Convention Between the United States of America and Canada with Respect to Taxes on
Income and on Capital, U.S.-Can., arts. XXIV, XXVIA, Sept. 26, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11087
[hereinafter Canada-U.S. Convention]. While the United States retains the right to tax its
citizens in accordance with domestic law, the Convention respects the primary right of the
source state to tax and provides that the United States will relieve double taxation, including
in the case of citizens.
19. See Canada-U.S. Double Tax Convention, supra note 18, art. XXVIA.
20. This reflects the common law “revenue rule,” which is observed by both the
United States and Canada, as well as many other countries. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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The fact that the IRS is not entitled to assistance in collection from the
Canadian Revenue Authority (CRA) with respect to Tina might assist her
in coming to a negotiated settlement with the IRS. However, Tina is likely
unaware of her rights to appeal and negotiate, and in respect of U.S. col-
lection against her in Canada. Even if she were aware, she might face a
major obstacle in the form of affordability of adequate professional ad-
vice. Finally, even if she managed to overcome the obstacles of both
awareness and resources, Tina would probably not wish to risk falling
afoul of the government of the United States.
These observations suggest that the United States cannot legally en-
force its claims against Tina by physical force or by seizure in a foreign
territory unless Canada grants its express permission and directly aids in
the effort. Yet, Tina’s position relative to the United States has now be-
come a subject of Canadian law, since Canada has agreed to implement
FATCA under an intergovernmental agreement with the United States.21
Canada made this agreement because, as written, FATCA would pe-
nalize Canadian financial institutions that did not force affected Canadian
residents like Tina to give up either their rights in Canadian law or their
access to normal financial services in Canada.22 Canadian financial institu-
tions reasonably sought to be released from the legal risks in Canada at-
tendant to enforcing this choice, and the economic risks in the United
States attending to non-enforcement.23 The Canadian Government re-
sponded accordingly by agreeing to implement FATCA, despite early ad-
monitions from former Finance Minister Jim Flaherty that highlighted the
fundamental incompatibility of the regime with international laws respect-
ing the right of jurisdictions to regulate beyond their territorial borders.24
As a result, even though Tina is a permanent Canadian resident and
citizen whose income is entirely Canadian-sourced and held in Canadian
financial accounts, Canada has responded to economic pressure from the
United States to treat her as a U.S. person for U.S. tax purposes. The
21. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
United States of America to Improve International Tax Compliance through Enhanced Ex-
change of Information under the Convention Between the United States of America and
Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, U.S.-Can., Feb. 4, 2014 (Enhanced
International Information Reporting provisions).
22. I.R.C. § 1471(a) (imposing withholding on financial institutions that do not comply
with information requirements); I.R.C. § 1471(b)(1)(F)(i) (requiring financial institutions to
obtain waivers of any rights in foreign law that would otherwise prevent such institutions
from disclosing personal information to third parties, or to close accounts where such waiver
requests are refused).
23. For a review of internal correspondence and public records attending the adoption
of the Intergovernmental Agreement in Canada, see Allison Christians, While Parliament
Sleeps: Tax Treaty Practice in Canada, 10 J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 15, 30-37 (2016).
24. Jim Flaherty, Letter on Americans in Canada, FINANCIAL POST (Sept. 16, 2011),
http://business.financialpost.com/news/read-jim-flahertys-letter-on-americans-in-canada
(“FATCA has far-reaching extraterritorial implications. It would turn Canadian banks into
extensions of the IRS. . . .”). For a detailed description of the Canadian Parliament’s enact-
ment of the Canada-U.S. Intergovernmental Agreement, see Feldman, supra note 5, at 605-
18.
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result of this decision is to subject Tina’s financial life to a level of intru-
sive scrutiny that cannot be applied to other Canadian residents under Ca-
nadian law without the intervention of a judge.25 This type of scrutiny
could not be similarly applied to Tina under U.S. law were she and her
accounts located in the United States.26 The additional financial surveil-
lance includes requiring Canadian financial institutions to furnish bulk ac-
count and asset information to the tax agency on the U.S.-defined
population of U.S. persons in Canada.27
Tina’s story demonstrates two truths about taxing on the basis of citi-
zenship or legal status alone. First: that the United States lacks control
over the target population precisely because these individuals permanently
reside under the control of another sovereign authority. Second: taxing
individuals resident in other countries can only be achieved if the other
sovereign authorities directly assist in the task, which requires expressly
overriding their own laws.28 Both of these observations suggest that the
United States has no legitimate claim on the global community with re-
25. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 § 231.2(2) (Can.) (conditioning the Minis-
ter’s authorization to require third parties to disclose information relating to one or more
unnamed persons upon the prior authorization of a judge). The compulsion of a foreign state
to enable its officials to act against individuals resident in the territory in manners not consis-
tent with the law of that territory appear inconsistent with the law prohibiting foreign com-
pulsion, which holds that states “may not require a person . . . to do an act in another state
that is prohibited by the law of that state.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW § 441 (AM. LAW INST. 1986).
26. In its intergovernmental FATCA agreements, the U.S. Treasury promises no more
than to seek appropriate legislative authorization that would allow it to fully reciprocate with
its FATCA partners, because current U.S. law authorizes financial institutions to disclose
only specific and very limited tax information to the IRS. See I.R.C. § 6041-6050W (listing
information concerning transactions with other persons); see also Canada-U.S. IGA, supra
note 14, art. 6:
The Government of the United States acknowledges the need to achieve
equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic information exchange with Canada. The
Government of the United States is committed to further improve transparency
and enhance the exchange relationship with Canada by pursuing the adoption of
regulations and advocating and supporting relevant legislation to achieve such
equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic information exchange.
27. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 §§ 263-269 (outlining enhanced international
information reporting for U.S. FATCA).
28. I.R.C. §§ 7701(a)(30)(A), (b)(1)(A) (2014) (defining “U.S. Person” to include citi-
zens, legal permanent residents, and actual residents, as defined by physical presence). Legal
permanent residents who no longer live in the United States are not entitled to return to live
and work in the country but must undertake biannual documentation requirements and may
be denied entry on grounds they have abandoned their status. However, under current law a
green card holder remains a U.S. person for tax purposes until she meets specified exit docu-
mentation requirements and pays exit fees where applicable. Contrary to popular wisdom,
legal permanent resident status does not expire, although the green card evidencing such
status does and must be renewed every ten years. Like most other countries, the United
States also imposes taxation on income earned from domestic sources by foreign persons. See
generally I.R.C. § 871 (2015). This distinction can cause some confusion and is discussed
more fully below.
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spect to enforcement of citizenship taxation, whether via FATCA or
otherwise.
Citizenship-based taxation is not only incompatible with international
legal standards on taxation, but it is an antiquated policy in the context of
a world of increasing cross-border mobility.29 Until the passage of FATCA
in 2010, the policy was unenforced and effectively unenforceable as to mil-
lions of individuals who lived their entire lives in other countries but hap-
pened to have U.S. citizenship.30 Tina’s experience demonstrates that
FATCA has created a legal method for the United States to reach across
sovereign borders to identify some of these previously unknown tax sub-
jects. But FATCA does not enable the United States to coerce all nonresi-
dent citizens to submit to its tax jurisdiction, nor does it entitle the United
States to assistance in enforcement from other countries.
Instead, as FATCA comes closer to full implementation in practice, it
reveals ever more clearly that the gulf between the jurisdiction claimed
and that which can be enforced is permanent, fatal to the legitimate exer-
cise of authority, and incompatible with international law. The fact that
even a comprehensive extraterritorial rule like FATCA cannot close the
compliance gulf is one reason why taxing nonresidents on a worldwide
basis cannot be a legitimate act by a state.31 Propped up by history, polit-
ics, ill-formed sentiments of patriotism and widespread indifference to the
affected population, the claim upon nonresident citizens remains a policy
that is not likely to be dislodged by U.S. lawmakers.32 It will fall to courts
around the world to determine whether the U.S. position can be supported
in law.
29. See Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L.R. 169, 187-96 (2016) (outlin-
ing the vastly different relationships states have with their residents versus with their nonresi-
dent citizens); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, 58 TAX NOTES INT’L
389, 389 (2010) (stating that “[i]n a globalized world, citizenship-based taxation is an anach-
ronism that should be abandoned”).
30. Mason, supra note 29, at 177 (“Problems stemming from citizenship taxation have
grown with the affected population, and citizenship taxation seems ever more out-of-step
with a world in which countries increasingly recognize, and even encourage, dual and multi-
ple citizenship”); Avi-Yonah, supra note 29, at 389 (stating that “[c]itizenship-based taxation
. . . is in practice unadministrable”); Blum & Singer, supra note 2, at 705 (2008) (calling for a
change to residence-based taxation on grounds that the administration of citizenship-based
taxation “is too difficult and expensive for taxpayers and the IRS”). As discussed supra note
7, the fact of the inadministrability of citizenship-based taxation is implied by official and
academic accounts regarding the general noncompliance of U.S. persons with obligations to
report non-U.S. financial accounts.
31. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman & Ted Sichelman, Enforcement as Substance in Tax
Compliance, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1679, 1679-81 (2013) (stating that “[i]t is well known
that the government’s complete failure to enforce a law can nullify that law” and that “an
unenforced law is tantamount to no law at all”). Lederman and Sichelman make a convincing
argument that perfect enforcement is not required (and may not necessarily be beneficial) for
law to be legitimate, but that deliberately tailored selective enforcement may be just under
specified conditions. The conditions they describe are not met in the case of the enforcement
of citizenship taxation, since the information requisite to deliberation is unavailable to the
tax authority, as demonstrated herein.
32. See, e.g., Mason, supra note 29, at 182-83.
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Understanding how the United States defines its population of taxpay-
ers requires a confrontation with a long-standing capacity problem that
has created a significant gulf between the law on the books and the law in
action. This gulf begins with faulty design and unfolds inevitably into
faulty implementation. We may begin to explore the difficulty by review-
ing the framework of the U.S. tax jurisdiction and analyzing its rapidly
changing scope under FATCA.
B. Law’s Intent: the “U.S. Person”
To understand how a status like Tina’s can arise is to come to terms
with a gap that always exists between what is written down in law and
what can actually be carried out in practice. With respect to U.S. tax law
jurisdiction, a very large gap arises from an inherently flawed scope of rule
and develops erratically according to the state’s ability to enforce it. The
framework itself is simply stated. The United States generally33 imposes
income taxation on four groups of people:34
1. People who reside in the territory (as assessed by periods of
physical presence);35
2. Citizens;36
3. People who are lawfully entitled to reside permanently in the
territory (green card holders);37 and
4. People who are not described above but who earn income
from U.S. sources.38
Together, people described in categories 1 through 3 are referred to as
“U.S. Persons.”39 People described in category 4 are referred to as nonres-
ident aliens or foreign persons.40 U.S. Persons are generally taxed on a
worldwide basis—all income, from whatever source derived, while foreign
persons are generally subject to U.S. tax only on their U.S.-source
income.41
33. The complexity of the U.S. tax code is such that it has become habitual to attach
the word “generally’ to virtually every statement of legal principle in U.S. tax law. For every
rule there is a list of exceptions, and for every exception there are yet more exceptions.
Accordingly, the discussion herein is of a general nature, and important exceptions and ex-
ceptions to the exceptions have been ignored for reasons of expediency.
34. The word “person” includes certain legal entities under U.S. tax law. I.R.C.
§ 7701(a)(1) (2014). However, this Article focuses on the taxation of individuals and not
entities or other legal arrangements such as trusts. Accordingly, all references to the taxation
of people herein are intended to refer to the taxation of individuals.
35. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3) (2014).
36. I.R.C. § 7701 (a)(30)(A) (2014).
37. I.R.C. § 7701 (a)(30)(A), (b)(1)(A) (2014).
38. I.R.C. §§ 7701(b)(1)(B), 871, 872, 897 (2014).
39. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30) (2014).
40. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(B) (2014).
41. U.S. Persons are taxed on all income from wherever derived. I.R.C. § 61 (1984).
Nonresident aliens are generally subject to U.S. federal tax on income that is effectively
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Categories 1 and 4 represent the global practice of virtually all coun-
tries that use income taxation as a source of revenue, and for good rea-
son.42 Individuals who fall into categories 1 and 4 are universally
accessible to tax law enforcement efforts by the taxing state. This is be-
cause with respect to these two categories, the state virtually always con-
trols either the person receiving the income or the person paying the
income, or both.43
In the case of people who reside within the territory, the state has
control by virtue of its normal control over the territory as a matter of
sovereign rule.44 Subject to constitutional and perhaps international
human rights restrictions, the sovereign state may use its coercive power to
compel compliance with its tax laws, using the credible threat of seizure of
property or the person.45 This power explains why most countries with
income tax systems—including the United States—impose comprehensive
taxation on the basis of any individual’s sustained presence within the ju-
risdiction, regardless of nationality.46 Worldwide taxation of residents
(who are typically identified as such by factors such as physical presence
within or significant socio-economic contacts with a geographic territory)
has been accepted as normatively justified by legal scholars and experts
over the entire life of the modern income tax, is a common practice
around the world, and has even been described as customary law.47
connected to a trade or business in the United States and on certain fixed or determinable
annual or periodic income from U.S. sources. See I.R.C. §§ 871, 872, 897 (2015).
42. For discussion and comparative analysis of national practices, see generally AULT
& ARNOLD supra note 18; AVI-YONAH, supra note 18; ERNST & YOUNG, WORLDWIDE PER-
SONAL TAX AND IMMIGRATION GUIDE (2016-17), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAs
sets/Worldwide_Personal_Tax_and_Immigration_Guide_201617/$FILE/Worldwide%20Per
sonal%20Tax%20and%20Immigration%20Guide%202016-17.pdf.
43. This is not to suggest that enforcement is easy or straightforward; the volume of
legislation and jurisprudence associated with the administration of the law demonstrate that
it is neither. Rather the claim here is simply that the sovereign state’s coercive power over a
territory is understood to enable its ability to enforce tax laws on those present within the
territory, regardless of how they come to be there. This accords with general principles of
international jurisdiction. See, e.g., ALFRED M. BOLL, MULTIPLE NATIONALITY AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 291 (2007) (“The vast majority of individuals’ obligations to states do not
correspond to, or follow, nationality, but accrue to all persons. This reflects the primacy of
the territorial jurisdiction and power of the state.”).
44. The justification for asserting the right to tax nonresidents on domestic-source in-
come is that by voluntarily accessing the domestic market, the nonresident creates an eco-
nomic nexus with the state. See, e.g., Mason, supra note 29, at 178-79 (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 411 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1987)) (stating that
“under internationally accepted principles, the state can tax the [nonresident] person’s in-
come only if it arises in the state’s territory”). The nexus to the earner of U.S.-source income
is the reason why the statutory language of FATCA ties its requirements to nonresidents who
are investors in the United States.
45. See generally A.R. Albrecht, The Taxation of Aliens Under International Law, 29
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 145 (1952) (explaining theoretical justifications and historical practices of
states in the taxation of foreign persons).
46. See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 18, at 431-32.
47. The significance of this characterization is discussed infra in Part III.
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In the case of people who do not reside in the territory but who earn
income from U.S. sources (category 4), the United States can similarly
compel obedience to its tax laws by virtue of its control over either the
payors of the income or the property generating the income.48 With re-
spect to the former, withholding ensures that the coercive power of the
state is evenly applied to all the subjects of the tax.  With respect to the
latter, the power of the state to seize property ensures uniform applica-
tion.49 The enforceability of source-based taxation, supported over the
years by its fundamental justification on normative grounds, explains why
source-based taxation enjoys the same widespread acceptance around the
world as residence-based taxation.50
Where reporting and withholding is not mandated by law, and prop-
erty is not easily seized, however, the power of the state to compel compli-
ance dissolves. In such cases, the state loses its autonomous power to tax
consistently. For this reason, the power of the state to compel compliance
with respect to the remaining two categories (2 and 3 above) is inherently
inconsistent. Where these categories overlap with the conditions relevant
to taxation in categories 1 and 4, the state can enforce its claim using coer-
cive power as necessary. But this capacity is eliminated where the condi-
tions relevant to taxation in the other two categories are absent. Thus, as
to either citizens or green card holders, the United States can easily assert
its rule if the citizen or green card holder is also physically present within
the territory, on the same basis as described above.51 It can similarly assert
48. Thus, for nonresidents’ income from items such as stocks, bonds, licenses, and the
like, the United States (like most countries) imposes obligations to report and withhold taxa-
tion at source. I.R.C. § 1441 (2014). However, where the source of the income is fixed in
place, for example in the case of real property, the United States generally allows nonresi-
dent taxpayers to self-report. This makes sense because nonpayment can be cured by asset
seizure.
49. For a classic explanation, see Edward S. Stimson, Jurisdiction to Tax Income, 22
CORNELL L. REV. 487, 488 (1937) (examining jurisprudence regarding the taxing rights of the
several United States in respect of each other and concluding that “[t]he state having power
over the property which is the source of the income or over the payor of the income can, by
seizure of the property or corporeal suasion of the payor, withhold a portion of the income;
and the state having power over the person receiving the income can force him to pay”).
50. See AVI-YONAH, supra note 18, at 8-12; Mason, supra note 29, at 178-79; Allison
Christians, Drawing the Boundaries of Tax Justice, in THE QUEST FOR TAX REFORM CONTIN-
UES: THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION FIFTY YEARS LATER 63-65 (Kim Brooks ed.,
2013) [hereinafter Christians, Drawing the Boundaries]; AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 18, at
431-32. Countries typically reduce or eliminate source-based tax on certain passive income
items in the case of a treaty. In such cases, the country of residence is typically expected to
tax such items, and may be aided by the source country by the exchange of tax information.
See, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD),
MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL arts. 10-13, 26
(2014), [hereinafter OECD MODEL CONVENTION] http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/2014-
model-tax-convention-articles.pdf (providing the maximum rates for withholding at the
source for specified passive income items and mechanisms for information exchange,
respectively).
51. The distinction between worldwide taxation (which refers to the practice of taxing
all income from whatever source derived) and residence-based taxation (which refers to tax-
206 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 38:193
its rule over U.S.-source income as to citizens and green card holders who
earn income from U.S. sources.
The same cannot be said of non-U.S. source income earned by nonres-
ident citizens and green card holders, however. As to this income, consis-
tent enforcement of U.S. taxation is virtually impossible without enlisting
the aid of other countries at their own expense.52 It is for this reason that
the vast majority of the world eschews the taxation of nonresidents on
their foreign income, even if they are citizens or nationals.53 Likely the
most oft-cited exception to this rule is Eritrea, which attempts to tax its
nonresident citizens permanently at a flat rate of 2% of worldwide income.
It does this to finance ongoing war, and has been denounced by the United
States, Canada, and the United Nations for the practice.54
Put another way, other than in the case of Eritrea, which has been
prevented from accomplishing its aims by the United States itself, no for-
eign country routinely asserts the right to tax U.S. residents on their U.S.-
source income.55 Yet, the United States claims the permanent right to tax
foreign income earned by foreign residents on the basis of their citizenship
alone.56 For almost one hundred years, this claim was simply unenforce-
able except as to individuals who voluntarily complied either on their own
behalf or in the case of U.S.-based companies with respect to their em-
ployees. This lack of enforcement may be explained by the state’s inherent
lack of sufficient unilateral control over nonresidents who lack economic
ties or activities in the territory.
ing a category of persons based on where they live) has caused some confusion in public
discourse over the taxation of citizens. For example, the New York Times erroneously re-
ported in early 2015 that China was embracing U.S.-style citizenship-based taxation by en-
forcing “a little-known and widely ignored regulation: Citizens and companies must pay
domestic taxes on their entire worldwide incomes, not just on what they earn in China.”
Keith Bradsher, China Wants Taxes Paid by Citizens Living Afar, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/business/international/china-starts-enforcing-tax-law-
for-citizens-working-abroad.html. This conflated worldwide taxation of residents, which
many countries exercise, with worldwide taxation of nonresidents based solely on their legal
status as citizens, which virtually no country, including China, exercises.
52. See generally Susan C. Morse, Ask for Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of Global Tax
Reporting, 57 VILL. L. REV. 529 (2012).
53. Some countries, including Finland, Hungary, Spain, and Turkey, have “clinging”
residency rules that in general terms treat nonresident citizens or nationals as residents for
tax purposes for a specified time period, sometimes with exceptions for treaty countries or a
showing of real ties to another jurisdiction. See OECD, RULES GOVERNING TAX RESIDENCE,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-implementation-and-assistance/tax-resi-
dency/ (last updated Nov. 18, 2016) (providing an overview of the tax residency rules of the
mentioned jurisdictions, among others).
54. S.C. Res. 2023, ¶ 11 (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/
%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%20RES%202023.
pdf (“Eritrea shall cease using extortion, threats of violence, fraud and other illicit means to
collect taxes outside of Eritrea from its nationals or other individuals of Eritrean descent.”).
55. Mason, supra note 29, at 172.
56. For a detailed explanation, see id. at 179-82.
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Even though it lacks the physical control associated with residence
and source-based taxation, some opportunities may arise for the United
States to enforce its tax jurisdiction on certain nonresidents with non-U.S.
source income. For example, the IRS appears to contemplate having broad
powers to seize the bank deposits of certain nonresident U.S. Persons
through the global banking system, even if such individuals never directly
interact with the U.S. economy.57 Certainly, the United States could physi-
cally seize a person who makes herself available to seizure, such as by
physically crossing into the territory or presenting herself at an embassy or
consulate and identifying herself as a citizen or green card holder. Less
drastically, the United States could opt instead to use such interactions as
an opportunity to provide nonresident citizens and green card holders with
information and express expectations as to compliance with its tax laws.58
Even if the law is effectively unenforceable, many U.S. Persons will at
least attempt to comply once they know that compliance is expected.
Although it does not currently do so, the United States could use
other interactions it has with nonresident citizens and green card holders
as opportunities to articulate its intention to tax them. The citizen’s appli-
cation for passport renewal, registration of the birth of a child abroad,59
registration at an embassy or consulate for travel or other purposes, or
57. The IRS may generally seize financial assets held by U.S. banks, subject to a 21-
day notice period. I.R.C. §§ 6331, 6332, 7401 (2015); 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.6332-3, 301.7401-1. The
commissioner may seize assets “without delay” if he fears the taxpayer plans to move assets
to avoid seizure. I.R.C. § 6861; see also United States v. Stonehill, 702 F.2d 1288, 1292 (9th
Cir. 1983). The IRS takes the position that a levy on one branch of a bank is effective against
funds held in all branches of the bank if the bank’s internal account system allows one branch
to freeze accounts across all branches. See, e.g., Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Klein, No. 92-CV-
2016, 1993 WL 403967, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1993). This would suggest that a deposit in a
foreign branch could be seized indirectly by imposing the levy on a U.S. branch of the same
bank, provided the internal controls allow cross-branch freezing of accounts. However, this
position is subject to disagreement. For a discussion, see STEVEN R. MATHER & PAUL H.
WEISMAN, FEDERAL TAX COLLECTION PROCEDURE – LIENS, LEVIES, SUITS AND THIRD
PARTY LIABILITY (PORTFOLIO 637) IV(C)(3)(c)(1) (2016), Bloomberg BNA. The IRS may
enforce a levy on deposits held by a foreign branch of a U.S. bank if the IRS specifies its
intent to do so in its notice of levy on the U.S. bank, which it may so specify if the IRS
“believes that the taxpayer is within the jurisdiction of a U.S. court” and the foreign branch
possesses deposits of the taxpayer. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6332-1(a)(1). U.S. Persons are within the
jurisdiction of a U.S. court by virtue of I.R.C. § 7701(a)(39) (2014) (“If any citizen or resident
of the United States does not reside in (and is not found in) any United States judicial dis-
trict, such citizen or resident shall be treated as residing in the District of Columbia for pur-
poses of any provision of this title relating to—(A) jurisdiction of courts, or (B) enforcement
of summons.”). This suggests that even where cross-branch freezing of accounts is not availa-
ble the IRS could in effect force a U.S. bank to seize deposits from its foreign branch where it
“believes” a U.S. Person is involved. It is not clear what belief means as applied to the IRS.
58. The mere articulation of the law’s expectations may be sufficient to compel some
level of compliance even where coercive power is absent. Compliance seems especially likely
if the individual expects to have future interactions with or within the United States, such as
green card holders that expect to return to the United States.
59. The parents of a child they believe to be a U.S. citizen who is born abroad can
obtain a certificate of “consular report of birth abroad of a citizen of the United States of
America,” so long as their belief is valid. 22 C.F.R. § 50.7. The certificate is obtained by
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registration to vote seem like neglected opportunities for taxpayer infor-
mation and education. In regards to the green card holder, the opportunity
to exert the tax jurisdiction arises even more regularly. The individuals’
application for permission to re-enter the United States as a permanent
resident is a ready opportunity. Green card holders who take up tempo-
rary residence outside the United States must seek re-entry permits in or-
der to preserve their status.60
Where the individual’s general intent to return to the territory
prompts her to fulfill documentary requirements, the nonresident green
card holder seems, perhaps counter-intuitively, more accessible to enforce-
ment efforts (and may even be more willing to comply) than a nonresident
citizen like Tina, whose only tie to the jurisdiction arises from the accident
of birth. In contrast, the citizen who never comes forward to identify as
such, and never enters U.S. territory, and the green card holder who stays
abroad permanently without meeting documentary requirements, are less
likely candidates for unilateral extraterritorial enforcement of the U.S. tax
jurisdiction.
Thus, on its face, the tax law applies equally to all individuals who are
citizens or green card holders whether they choose to acknowledge that
status or not. However, prior to the enactment of FATCA at least, both
categories of individuals were often beyond the reach of U.S. law enforce-
ment unless they were also descriptively covered in the residence or
source categories. To the extent such individuals complied with U.S. tax
law, they did so on a purely voluntary basis.61 Statistical assessment of
nonresident tax filings suggest that volunteerism was the exception rather
than the rule.62
providing proof of the birth, adequate proof of the identity and nationality, paying a fee, and
waiting for the consular to validate all of the information provided.
60. See Maintaining Permanent Residence, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV.,
http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/after-green-card-granted/maintaining-permanent-residence
(last updated Feb. 17, 2016).
61. This is still true after FATCA because unenforceability remains a systemic prob-
lem for the U.S. tax jurisdiction, not least owing to IRS resource constraints. Since it is not
clear how, or how well, the IRS can (or intends to) enforce the law on all of the individuals
exposed to it through FATCA, it is possible that citizenship-based taxation remains a paper
tiger for many nonresident U.S. Persons. If that is so, FATCA’s main impact may in future be
judged as an exercise in introducing little but fear to the U.S. diaspora. That in itself is
grounds for concern from a normative perspective. The concern increases if the result of fear
is that many people will try to comply with an impossibly complex legal regime at heavy
personal expense relative to either the tax revenues or the legal principles at stake, while
those the law actually intended to reach continue to thwart the rightful application of the law
to them.
62. See, e.g., Harvey, supra note 7, at 473 (stating that prior to FATCA, U.S. persons
“were on the honor system” in terms of reporting non-U.S. financial accounts, and that “it
would appear many U.S. taxpayers with offshore accounts have not been very honest”); Ma-
son, supra note 29, at 219. This is also the case for financial reporting obligations, which are
not tax obligations but are administered by the IRS with similar (but not identical) scope as
the tax jurisdiction. See, e.g., Steven Toscher & Michel R. Stein, FBAR Enforcement-Five
Years Later, 10 J. TAX PRAC. & PROC. 37, 37-38 (2008); Eschrat Rahimi-Laridjani,
FBAR–Where We Are and How We Got There, 8 J. TAX’N FIN. PRODUCTS 29, 29-30 (2009).
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Before FATCA was enacted, the U.S. tax jurisdiction was therefore
unequally enforceable by design across the four categories of taxpayer.
For those taxed on the basis of source or residence, consistent with global
tax norms and widespread practice, the jurisdiction has been enforceable,
that is, capable of being broadly applied as a matter of administrative ca-
pacity. For those taxed on the basis of legal status alone, however, the
enforceability of the tax jurisdiction depended almost entirely on the indi-
vidual’s own knowledge and willingness to be subject to the tax. Living
within or earning income from sources within the territory generally made
worldwide taxation of citizens and green card holders possible. Living be-
yond the territory conversely made enforcement largely subject to the in-
dividual’s inclination to be included in the jurisdiction.
FATCA changed this status quo but it did not eliminate it. This is be-
cause FATCA’s approach to identifying persons subject to the U.S. tax
jurisdiction does not align with the U.S. tax jurisdiction as defined by stat-
ute. Instead, FATCA has made some people more likely to be visible to
the IRS as U.S. Persons whether they belong in that category or not, as a
matter of law, while structurally ignoring other people who are in fact U.S.
Persons as the law defines the term. In this respect, Tina’s story diverges
from other Accidental Americans by virtue of the geographic circum-
stances of her birth.
C. Law’s Reach after FATCA
FATCA engages the world in a quest to reveal to the United States all
significant financial assets held by U.S. Persons throughout the world.63 In
so doing, for the first time in U.S. history, the United States is cataloguing
a globally dispersed population of nonresident U.S. Persons. But, it is do-
ing so in a way that is guaranteed to be both inconsistent and unjust. This
point was driven home by U.S. lawmakers themselves, in the context of
proposing specific reforms to the harsh rules for expatriation as applied to
permanent nonresidents who happened to acquire U.S. citizenship at birth
but have never acted upon that status in a meaningful way.64
FATCA accomplishes its cataloguing function with a two-step classifi-
cation system involving a list of indicia and a self-certification process.65
These two steps are buttressed by a requirement that “relationship manag-
ers” make assumptions about U.S. Person status by using facts known to
63. “Significant” because of the nominal thresholds. “Nominal” because banks need
not observe the thresholds, and anecdotal information suggests that they are not doing so,
possibly because it introduces noncompliance risk owing to currency fluctuations and account
aggregation problems, among other issues.
64. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N (JCT), DESCRIPTION OF CERTAIN REVENUE PROVI-
SIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET PROPOSAL, 289 (Comm.
Print 2015) (acknowledging that any attempt to address obvious injustices in the treatment of
permanently nonresident citizens who seek to expatriate “may be either overbroad or under-
inclusive” and noting that “[i]t is . . . difficult to imagine any sort of subjective test that could
be administered consistently and fairly across this population”).
65. 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1471-4(c)(5)(iv)(B)(2)(i) - (vii).
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them that may be (but are not necessarily) relevant to determining that
status.66 The combination of these steps leads to the kind of letter received
by Tina to inform her of her status, seek confirmation, and describe the
consequences.
FATCA’s identification method does not align with the statutory con-
struction of the U.S. Person population described above. The misalign-
ment is evident when comparing the three U.S. Person categories to the
FATCA indicia meant to alert financial institutions to the possible exis-
tence of a U.S. Person. The misalignment continues to the verification
phase, where taxpayers are asked to furnish various negative proofs of
their status as U.S. Persons, as Tina was asked to do. By examining the
identification and verification processes, we begin to get a sense of the
population actually being targeted by FATCA to enforce U.S. taxation
and financial reporting requirements on nonresidents.
FATCA has financial institutions searching for U.S. Persons by look-
ing for the following “indicia” of status:67
1. Account holder is identified as a U.S. citizen or resident;
2. Birthplace in the United States;
3. A U.S. telephone number;
4. A U.S. residence or mailing address;
5. Standing instructions to transfer funds to a U.S. based
account;
6. Indications of a power of attorney over the account to a per-
son with a U.S. address; or
7. A “care of” or hold mail address as the sole address.
In addition, where indicia are not present, a “responsible officer” must
certify as to any knowledge of an account holder’s status as a U.S. Person,
and must monitor its accountholders for possible changes in
circumstances.68
Other than the first factor on the list, the FATCA indicia do not align
with the three categories of U.S. Person as defined by I.R.C. § 7701. None
66. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1471-4(c)(5).
67. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1471-4(c)(5).
68. To ensure compliance with FATCA, a financial institution must designate a “re-
sponsible officer” who must represent to the best of her knowledge that “no formal or infor-
mal practices or procedures were in place to assist account holders in the avoidance of
FATCA.” T.D. 9610, Regulations Relating to Information Reporting by Foreign Financial
Institutions and Withholding on Certain Payments to Foreign Financial Institutions and
Other Foreign Entities (Apr. 8, 2013) at Part V.C.5(e) (explaining revisions to regulations
under I.R.C. § 1471). After making initial certifications, the responsible officer of the partici-
pating foreign financial institution (FFI) will also need to periodically certify to the IRS that
she conducted periodic reviews of the FFI’s compliance with due diligence, withholding, and
reporting obligations under the FFI agreement. Id. The responsible officer may be required
to provide certain factual information and to disclose material failures with respect to the
participating FFI’s compliance with any of the requirements of the FFI agreement. Id.
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of the other indicia—even birthplace in the United States—is incontro-
vertible evidence of such status.69
1.  Physical Presence
As described above, the first category of U.S. Persons defines those
who physically reside in the United States, regardless of their citizenship
or nationality. Conventional wisdom suggests that FATCA is primarily in-
tended to find the foreign accounts of this group: the imagined target is the
quintessential American tax evader who intentionally and purposefully
sets up a numbered bank account in a jurisdiction that is willing to shield
its account holders from detection for the purpose of evading U.S. tax
laws.
The test for this category of U.S. Person for tax purposes is an objec-
tive quantitative measurement, namely, days spent in the United States.70
The greatest advantage of this bright line test is its certainty: with little
room for ambiguity, humans are at any given time always present in one
place, and one place only.71 We might therefore expect at least some of
the FATCA indicia to line up with the substantial presence rules in some
way. However, it is fairly easy to see why physical presence is not among
the FATCA indicia at all. A brief examination illustrates why this is so.
Discovering U.S. Person accountholders who meet the substantial
presence test would involve analyzing financial trails of personal travel
records. For example, banks might search disbursements in various juris-
dictions as recorded in bank-issued debit or credit card records. Besides
being highly invasive, since all accounts worldwide would have to be ana-
lyzed, this would almost certainly be an expensive and overwhelming ad-
ministrative task. Moreover, it seems obvious that if counting days was
accomplished by analyzing spending records, determined tax evaders
would change their behaviors to avoid detection. Unscrupulous issuers of
debit and credit cards might rise to the challenge; noncash alternatives
such as bitcoin might also get a boost from such a policy. Substantial pres-
ence is something that the federal government can reliably accomplish
only by itself, with border controls. It is not something a bank can (or
probably should) accomplish with financial records.
Accordingly, none of the FATCA indicia directly expose physical
presence: instead, FATCA introduces proxies for the substantial presence
test. An individual’s listed residence or mailing address likely comes clos-
est to representative as a proxy—it seems probable that someone who lists
a U.S. address as their residence in a non-U.S. bank’s account records is in
69. The complexity associated with charging financial institutions with assessing citi-
zenship status is arguably why self-certification was chosen as the only viable option for as-
sembling the nonresident citizen population, even though this is fundamentally unjust.
70. Substantial presence is defined in terms of physical presence exceeding a number
of days calculated under a weighted formula. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3) (2014).
71. Living in a border town poses a ready exception to objective certainty; figuring out
what a “day” means to the IRS is perhaps less obvious to the casual observer but no less a
source of potential ambiguity in the calculation.
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fact present at that address for some significant number of days in the
year.  Similarly, a U.S. telephone number or standing transfer instructions
in bank records provide less direct but at least some reason to believe that
a person has some kind of ongoing physical presence in the United States.
A power of attorney with a U.S. mailing address seems more attenu-
ated. As to the nonresident accountholder herself, having a U.S.-based
power of attorney might be explained by having a child who immigrated to
the United States, which says nothing about her own status.72 The power
of attorney on a non-U.S. Person’s account might lead not to the ac-
countholder but to the power of attorney herself, who may in the future
control the foreign account. Birthplace is of course unrelated to substan-
tial presence other than in the year of birth.73
2. Citizenship
“Citizens” are the second category of U.S. Person described above.
Only two of the indicia have any direct bearing on one’s status as a citizen,
namely, the account holder’s identification as such, and birthplace in the
United States. The first of these indicia confirms the voluntary nature of
the nonresident citizen’s acquiescence to this status. The second speaks to
a major knowledge gap with serious consequences.
Announcing oneself as a U.S. citizen to a non-U.S. bank seems to be
the clearest indication that the accountholder is in fact a U.S. citizen and
therefore a U.S. Person for tax purposes. Such an “announcement” is
probably most often accomplished by opening the account with a U.S.
passport as the primary identification document, but it might also be ac-
complished by mentioning one’s status as such to a bank manager in pass-
ing. However, this is not to say that announcing oneself as a U.S. citizen
should be interpreted as knowledge of one’s obligations to file income tax
returns in the United States: the opposite appears to be the case for many
Accidental Americans.74
Birthplace in the United States on the other hand highlights a clear
difficulty in imposing citizenship-based taxation. A person born within the
territory of the United States is usually entitled to birthright citizenship,
with few exceptions.75 That is why Tina is automatically a citizen, without
72. This could be common among non-citizen residents of neighboring Canada, for
instance.
73. While it might seem intuitive to assume that a person born in the United States
likely resided in the United States for at least some period after birth, this is not necessarily
the case. A frequently cited example is the prevalence of border towns where, in the past,
residents of Canada freely passed into the United States for the purpose of childbirth in the
nearest hospital. See, e.g., Derek Lundy, Stanstead: A Town on the Border, CANADIAN GEO-
GRAPHIC (July 1, 2010), https://www.canadiangeographic.ca/article/stanstead-town-border.
74. See, e.g., JCT, supra note 64, at 289 (“An individual who has been a dual citizen
since birth and who has neither been tax resident in the United States as an adult nor held a
U.S. passport (other than for departing the United States) might be considered blameless for
not having complied with U.S. citizenship-based tax obligations.”).
75. See U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 688, 703, 709 (1898); see also Expatriation
Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 1228, 1229 (1907). Exceptions apply to the children of diplomatic of-
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any independent action on her part or that of her parents. However, the
definition of a citizen in U.S. law has not been static, and it appears often
misunderstood by those who receive the status by birthright but have
never lived permanently in the country. For example, commonly expressed
among the global birthright diaspora are beliefs that citizenship must be
accepted or activated by the individual and that birth does not confer citi-
zenship automatically, but requires application by a parent.76 The poten-
tial for misunderstanding is only further increased in the case of those
born abroad to a U.S. parent, as the rules for citizenship have changed
over time for this group.77
Moreover, citizenship can generally be changed by the individual
through relinquishment78 or renunciation.79 In the past, it was possible for
a person to relinquish her citizenship automatically upon naturalization in
ficers and others. In addition, the rules for U.S. territories and possessions are myriad and
complex. See 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(22); see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAN-
UAL § 1120 (2013), https://fam.state.gov/fam/07fam/07fam1120.html.
76. These observations were made to the author and are anecdotal. Discussions I have
had with U.S. tax and immigration lawyers over the past six years confirm that differences of
opinion, misunderstandings, and incorrect assumptions and beliefs about how citizenship is
obtained are widespread among the Accidental American community.
77. Immigration and citizenship law in the United States flows from the constitution-
ally articulated power of the federal government to “establish a uniform Rule of Naturaliza-
tion.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (detailing federal rules and
standards regarding deportable aliens). These rules have been periodically reformed and re-
vised according to political and social circumstances. The Patriot Act of 2001 is the most
recent comprehensive legislative reform. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Moreover,
the law is subject to agency and judicial interpretation and application. The Department of
Homeland Security, established in 2002, oversees all matters involving immigration and natu-
ralization and is the parent agency of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(U.S.C.I.S.), the agency directly responsible for administering the Immigration and National-
ity Act. U.S.C.I.S. issues memoranda, administrative decisions, and generalized guidance. In
addition, President Obama recently sought to alter legislated outcomes by recourse to his
plenary executive power, but his efforts are currently subject to judicial review. See, e.g., U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., EXECUTIVE ACTIONS ON IMMIGRATION (2015), http://
www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction; Obama’s Immigration Executive Actions on Hold Until
Legal Challenge Resolved, PBS NEWSHOUR (May 28, 2015, 6:30 PM), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/obamas-immigration-executive-actions-hold-legal-challenge-resolved.
78. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL: LOSS AND RES-
TORATION OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP § 1200 (2014); 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (stating that relinquishing acts
include becoming naturalized in a foreign state after age 18, making an oath of allegiance to a
foreign state after age 18, serving in the armed forces of a foreign state under certain circum-
stances, or committing an act of treason).
79. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481(a)(5)-(6), 1488 (laying out procedures required to renounce);
Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 334 (1939) (“Expatriation is the voluntary renunciation or aban-
donment of nationality and allegiance.”). Citizenship acquired through misrepresentation
may also be judicially revoked under recommendation of the U.S.C.I.S. See 8 C.F.R. § 340.2;
see also Order Granting Permanent Injunction, iGorbach v. Reno, No. 98-CV-0278, 2001 WL
34145464 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 14, 2001) (entering order pursuant to Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d
1087 (9th Cir. 2000)). Further, if a person held any reservations to the oath taken when
becoming a citizen or committed any fraud relating to the taking of citizenship, citizenship
may be revoked through an administrative process. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.
759, 761–62 (1988); Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490, 505-18 (1981); Polites v.
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another country.80 However, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected this posi-
tion and reinstated citizenship once thought lost.81 The beneficiaries of
this decision were officially notified of neither their reinstatement nor the
tax consequences thereof. Today, the individual must generally display in-
tent in order to lose citizenship status.82 One pernicious outcome of this
rule is that individuals who lack the capacity to renounce will be “trapped”
in their citizenship.83 The inability to renounce citizenship inevitably
forces the caregivers and guardians of such individuals to permanently
comply with U.S. taxation rules, at great expense, and for no justified pol-
icy reason.84 This outcome seems patently unjust by any measure, yet it is
an inescapable result of permanently tying taxation to citizenship.
The interplay of immigration rules with taxation on the basis of citi-
zenship is subject to intense debate and certainly exceeds the scope of
common wisdom among the permanently nonresident population of birth-
right citizens.85 In the past, expatriation would have automatically negated
a person’s citizenship status for tax purposes; at present, it does not.86 In-
United States, 364 U.S. 426, 427-28 (1960); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 656, 669
(1946); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 233-34 (1912).
80. See Savorgnan v. United States et al., 338 U.S. 491, 505-06 (1950) (holding that the
plaintiff had lost her American citizenship by applying for and obtaining Italian citizenship
followed by residence abroad).
81. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 253 (1980) (holding that the government must
prove intent to surrender U.S. citizenship and not just the voluntary commission of an expa-
triating act).
82. Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 253; Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 255, 259, 264 (1967).
However, see 8 U.S.C § 1481(b) for rebuttable presumptions. See also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 1200 app. B (2012).
83. A person that seeks to relinquish citizenship must proclaim her specific intent to
engage in the expatriating act; such an act therefore cannot be undertaken by another, such
as a parent or guardian. See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (individuals will lose their U.S. citizenship
only by “voluntarily performing any of the following acts with the intention of relinquishing
United States nationality”); DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL, ch. 12-1 (2011) (outlining the evolution of U.S. rules limit-
ing the ability to expatriate); SIGAL R. BEN-PORATH & ROGERS M. SMITH, VARIETIES OF
SOVEREIGNTY AND CITIZENSHIP, 107-08 (2013) (explaining the evolution of U.S. jurispru-
dence and legislation surrounding the requirement of intent for the relinquishment of citizen-
ship). For a first-person account of this issue, see Hildebrandt, supra note 3 (describing the
difficult choices facing the Canadian citizen parents of a 40-year old developmentally dis-
abled son, born in Canada while his parents were U.S. citizens, who cannot renounce his
citizenship; the financial accounts built up to provide for his ongoing care are subject to
reporting and taxation in the United States despite being exempt from taxation in Canada
and directly contributed to by the Canadian government as part of a registered disability
savings plan).
84. Hildebrandt, supra note 3.
85. To my knowledge, no court has considered whether the United States has the au-
thority, as a matter of law, to annually impose personal tax and reporting obligations on
individuals who are neither citizens nor residents, solely by virtue of their failure to file docu-
mentary obligations imposed by regulation.
86. I.R.C. §§ 877(a)(2)(c), 877A, 7701(a)(50)(A) (2014). Specifically, the American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004 “created a disparity between expatriation for nationality purposes
and expatriation for tax purposes.” See Letter from Armando Gomez, Chair, Am. Bar Ass’n
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deed, the definition of citizen for tax purposes is potentially circular in the
application.87 These complications attending to birthright citizenship are
sufficiently detailed and specific to the individual that they create legal
uncertainty that is not answered in the tax law, let alone in FATCA
indicia.
Accordingly, mailing address is to substantial presence as birthplace is
to citizenship. In a vast majority of cases, a person born in the United
States is probably still a U.S. citizen today. On the other hand, for some
not insignificant portion of this population, subsequent action may have
negated that status at some point, making the two categories imperfect
proxies.
At the same time, the FATCA indicia structure completely ignores an
entire population of U.S. Persons who are also birthright citizens, namely,
those born or adopted abroad with claims to citizen status by virtue of
their parentage.88 To the extent that such persons also display indicia con-
nected to substantial presence, FATCA may enable effective regulation.
Absent such factors, FATCA creates a class of underground citizens—
those who have never explored or acknowledged their citizenship in
meaningful ways but who, assuming their circumstances were known to
the United States, would in all likelihood be regarded as citizens by birth.
This status is complicated, however, and it is worth noting what
FATCA leaves aside by necessity. A person born outside the United
States to two citizen parents, one of whom has been resident in the United
States, is typically understood to be a citizen at birth.89 However, that is
the relatively easy case. With one citizen parent, birth abroad is less
straightforward; it may depend on the date of birth and typically involves
some analysis of physical residence.90 The list of rules and exceptions is
long. Like Tina, many individuals who obtain citizenship through a parent
are Accidental Americans, unaware of the tax consequences flowing from
the citizenship status conferred upon them at birth.
U.S. immigration laws are, like the tax laws, a maze of complex and
sometimes contradictory-seeming rules and exceptions, with layers of con-
fusion added by sequential reforms and revisions. Since FATCA’s enact-
ment, an extremely profitable compliance industry has arisen to advise
millions of newly emerging potential U.S. Persons regarding their signifi-
Section of Taxation, to John Koskinen, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv., requesting Gui-
dance on the Tax Status of Certain Expatriates, 2 (Mar. 2, 2015) (on file with the American
Bar Association),  http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/taxation/poli
cy/030215comments.authcheckdam.pdf.
87. See Letter from Armando Gomez, supra note 86, at 9-10 (discussing the interplay
of I.R.C. § 877A(g)(3) and 8 U.S.C § 1481).
88. See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1; 8 U.S.C. § 1401; 8 C.F.R. § 322.2.
89. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c).
90. Id. (providing a detailed description of the circumstances under which citizenship
is attained at birth).
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cant tax obligations.91 The same is now occurring in respect of advising
individuals as to their U.S. citizenship status through parentage.92
Even as the citizenship tax compliance industry establishes itself, how-
ever, many persons who might be U.S. Persons by virtue of birthright citi-
zenship may not wish to claim this status. In recent analysis of proposed
tax law changes concerning certain nonresident citizens by the Obama ad-
ministration, the Joint Committee on Taxation noted that birthright citi-
zenship is inconsistent with the democratic principle that “a citizen’s
decision to remain a citizen, and an immigrant’s decision to become a citi-
zen, have been thought of as entirely volitional.”93 That volitional quality
still exists, depending on the circumstances of birth (and appetite for con-
cealment).94 Being born abroad, some birthright citizens can escape the
wrong, avoiding scrutiny by simply keeping silent. Others, like Tina,
cannot.
Even if concealment is possible, some birthright citizens may come
forward of their own volition for the express purpose of renouncing, in an
effort to be free of worry going forward. Some will do so under the mis-
taken impression that the United States cannot realistically intend to im-
pose financial punishments on them given their ignorance that their
birthright conferred obligations upon them. Others still may come forward
under the mistaken impression that their U.S. tax obligations may be eas-
ily remedied by simply renouncing their citizenship.95 These newly
awoken Accidental Americans, compelled by circumstances or conscience
to confront the expansive U.S. tax jurisdiction, often come to find that
ridding themselves of a citizenship they never voluntarily sought is a tre-
mendously expensive and time-consuming effort.
In the same category as birthright citizens born abroad are other U.S.
citizens born abroad, namely immigrants who acquired their citizenship
status by naturalization.96 This group is fundamentally unlike birthright
citizens in that naturalization is a voluntary undertaking. Yet, for the most
91. Author’s observation, confirmed in discussion with U.S. immigration specialists
within and outside the United States.
92. Author’s observation, confirmed in discussion with U.S. international tax compli-
ance specialists within and outside the United States.
93. JCT, supra note 64, at 288.
94. Except where the individual is deemed to lack capacity to renounce, as discussed
supra note 83 and accompanying text.
95. Under current law renunciation of citizenship is not only subject to consular visits
and fees, but it is ineffective to end citizenship-based taxation unless accompanied by proof
of tax compliance over five years. I.R.C. §§ 877(a)(2)(c); 877A, 7701(a)(50) (2014); I.R.S.
Form 8854, Initial and Annual Expatriation Statement, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/
f8854.pdf; see generally Morris, supra note 16. Tax compliance is complicated by the need to
obtain a social security number in order to file a tax return. Obtaining a social security num-
ber is itself an administrative process that may take as long as a year to complete.
96. See generally 8 U.S.C § 1421; Naturalization, WEX LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/naturalization (last visited Feb. 9, 2017); see also Citizenship & Nat-
uralization, 12 USCIS POL’Y MANUAL, http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/Policy
Manual-Volume12-PartD.html (last updated Aug. 3, 2016).
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part, a naturalized citizen who moves away from the United States looks
to a financial institution exactly like a U.S. citizen born abroad: virtually
undetectable without personal knowledge. It therefore seems at least de-
batable whether the United States truly seeks to draw in the full popula-
tion of U.S. citizens born elsewhere, given that the FATCA indicia are in
no way designed to expose them.
This kind of line-drawing is a source of systemic unfairness.97 Some-
one like Tina, born in the United States, is exposed by FATCA as a pre-
sumed citizen: whether she now fits that definition or not, she must
confront a legal quagmire. This forces her to verify her immigration status,
deal with citizenship-based taxation, and deal with renunciation if that be-
comes a necessity. If Tina had been born outside the territory to a U.S.
parent instead, she might never have been forced to confront this legal
regime even if she is in fact a U.S. citizen, whether by birth or by choice. If
all U.S. citizens are U.S. Persons by legal definition, systemically creating
differences in the enforcement of the tax law with drastically different con-
sequences seems problematic from a normative perspective.
3. Legal Permanent Residence
Finally, and also missing completely from FATCA’s indicia search, are
the third category of U.S. Persons, namely, green card holders. Like those
born abroad with access to U.S. citizenship, green card holders might be
discovered through FATCA if they have substantial presence-related indi-
cia. In addition, FATCA’s first indicia, identification as a resident, may
include some green card holders to the extent that such persons under-
stand the green card to treat them as effectively resident for tax purposes,
or if they used their green card to open a bank account and the bank
catalogued that action as an indication of residence. However, a green
card might be an unusual form of identification with which someone
would open an account outside the United States.
In law, discarding a green card is equivalent to citizenship termination
in terms of documentation requirements and tax impact.98 In practice, the
nonresident green card holder, like the nonresident naturalized citizen,
may have the most flexibility to discard her status without meeting these
requirements, and without further consequences, so long as she remains
outside the territory and removes assets from the reach of the IRS. She
may even be encouraged to effectively discard this status by her home
97. Horizontal equity is perhaps the most obvious fairness norm that is violated by an
arbitrarily-drawn line, where the consequences of falling on one side or the other are as
extreme as they are in the case of the U.S. Person category. Contra Michael Kirsch, 21st
Century Taxation of Americans Abroad: Citizenship-Based Taxation vs. Residence-Based
Taxation, YOUTUBE (May 2, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RMiAMc4NLxA (ar-
guing that the substantive merits of status-based taxation are independent of any administra-
tion or enforcement difficulties).
98. Although it differs in the lack of need for a certificate of loss of nationality to
prove non-U.S. status, thus avoiding the circular timing problem posed by I.R.C.
§§ 877(a)(2)(c); 877A, 7701(a)(50) (2014). See discussion in Morris, supra note 16.
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government. For example, after acknowledging that the United States con-
siders green card holders to be U.S. Persons, the Canada Revenue Agency
advises against identifying such status to Canadian financial institutions.99
This seems difficult to justify. After all, a green card holder, like a
naturalized citizen and unlike a birthright citizen, voluntarily chose to in-
teract with the United States. It seems appropriate to presume that indi-
viduals in this category have at least as much reason to know about U.S.
taxation as any nonresident citizen, and in many cases more so. A law on
the books that calls for taxing nonresidents solely on the basis of their
legal status is again difficult to view as just in the application, when in
practice FATCA systemically excludes green card holders from detection.
To be sure, as mere proxies to a status in law that is potentially com-
plex, indicia are not an end of themselves but a prompt to verification.
Thus, for each of the indicia, the financial institution must seek a specific
sort of documentary proof from the accountholder as to her status as a
U.S. Person.100 Each type of indicia requires distinct forms of documen-
tary negative proofs of U.S. Person status. These proofs range from a cer-
tificate of loss of nationality and a certificate of non-U.S. Person status,101
to proof of ‘foreign’ citizenship (government-issued ID that evidences for-
eign citizenship),102 to “Proof of claim of foreign status,”103 which may
include a certificate of residence from a foreign tax authority, a govern-
ment-issued identification (driver’s license), or an approved similar certifi-
cate.104 In practice it is easier for institutions to apply one type of
documentary proof, namely, a self-certification of U.S. status or non-U.S.
status (W9 and W8BEN, respectively).105 Anecdotal evidence suggests
that this method is the one typically employed.
Like the indicia, none of these documentary proofs provides conclu-
sive evidence that a person has or lacks U.S. Person status. The certificate
of loss of nationality proves that a person lacks U.S. citizenship, but is
99. See, e.g., Information for Individuals with Canadian Financial Institutions, CAN.
REVENUE SERV., http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/nnrsdnts/nhncdrprtng/ndvdls-eng.html (last
modified Dec. 23, 2014)
Q: “I hold a U.S. green card. How does this affect my tax residency?”
A: “If you are a green card holder (that is, a lawful permanent resident of the
U.S.), the U.S. considers you to be a U.S. resident. However, if you are a resi-
dent of Canada for tax purposes and do not hold U.S. citizenship, you should
not identify yourself as a U.S. person to your Canadian financial institution.”
100. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1471-4(c)(5)(iv)(B)(2)(i)-(vii).
101. This is required where the relevant indicia is the birthplace in the United States.
See 26 C.F.R. § 1.1471-4(c)(5)(iv)(B)(2)(ii) (Documentation to be retained upon identifying
U.S.  indicia); 26 C.F.R. § 1.1471-3(c)(3) (withholding certificates); 26 C.F.R. § 1.1471-
3(c)(5)(i)(B) (evidence of foreign citizenship).
102. This is required where the relevant indicia is the designation as a citizen or resident
or birthplace in the United States. See 26 C.F.R.  §§ 1.1471-4(c)(5)(iv)(B)(2)(i) and (ii).
103. This is required where the relevant indicia is a U.S. address or telephone number,
or U.S. power of attorney. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1471-4(c)(5)(iv)(B)(2)(iii)-(v), (vi).
104. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.1471-3(c)(5) (_______ certificates).
105. As described in 26 C.F.R. § 1.1471-3(c)(3).
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silent as to other U.S. Person status. Instead, the proofs are again more or
less weak proxies. The key to FATCA, and therefore to comprehensive
U.S. income taxation of U.S. Persons as defined in law, is still the individ-
ual’s decision to comply, in the form of self-certification as to legal status.
FATCA’s amazingly complex regime to detect U.S. Persons thus does not
eliminate arbitrary enforcement of citizenship-based taxation at all. It
merely shifts the goalposts.
II. BETWEEN LAW AND PRACTICE
Imperfectly integrated over 100 years, the architecture of taxation and
citizenship in the United States is best described as Kafkaesque. It in-
volves two legal structures imperfectly stapled together, with ongoing stat-
utory, administrative, and judicial interpretations, revisions and reforms in
each system creating new complexities and challenges for understanding
and implementation of the other. Understanding how these two systems
work together is a daunting task for practitioners in each field, with pre-
cious few spanning the two fields for an integrated practice. Merging one
legal system with another and then applying it on a global basis creates
intriguing problems for comparative law scholars, but in practice it means
that status-based taxation simply cannot work properly either in theory or
in fact. The result for individuals is chaos, and inevitable injustice in
application.
Accordingly, the gulf between the law on the books and the law in
action is in large part explained by a combination of three factors: igno-
rance on the part of taxpayers, obscurity of key legal principles (especially
citizenship), and neglect on the part of the tax administration. Despite
these three factors, FATCA’s mechanism for identifying tax subjects al-
lows the United States to impose claims on some people that it never
knew to exist, let alone to be subject to its laws. But it does so arbitrarily,
by design, and in contravention of the purported reach of the tax law. The
perverse effects make status-based taxation seem indefensible by any
measure.
A. Ignorance
The first of these perverse effects is an over- and under-inclusive citi-
zenship category by design. When financial institutions ask their ac-
countholders to self-certify as U.S. Persons, some will no doubt incorrectly
identify as U.S. Persons, while others will incorrectly self-identify as non
U.S. Persons. This will unearth a globally dispersed subpopulation of per-
sons incorrectly identified as U.S. Persons, which we might refer to as false
positives. At the same time, it will also unearth a globally dispersed sub-
population of persons who are in fact U.S. Persons—false negatives. These
errors carry serious consequences to the individuals involved as well as to
the integrity of the tax system as a whole.
First, all false positives will be subjected to automatic reporting of
their financial accounts to the IRS, and some may even be subject to U.S.
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taxation as if they were U.S. Persons, even if they are not.106 At the same
time, the false negatives will not be so reported, and therefore face much
less likelihood of being taxed by a country which actually would claim
them as taxpayers if they had properly self-certified.
Two commonly-held misconceptions appear to have led U.S.
lawmakers to adopt self-certification as a viable threshold to taxation. The
first of these is that “U.S. Person” is an intuitively obvious status because
citizenship is an intuitive status. The second is that taxation is an intui-
tively obvious conclusion that flows naturally from one’s status as a U.S.
Person. Neither principle holds in fact. Beyond the impossibility of even
enforcement of the law as written, ignorance is very clearly a valid excuse
for noncompliance on the part of a significant and globally dispersed
population.
On the whole, U.S. Persons who are resident in the United States ap-
pear unmoved by the plight of the nonresident taxpayer population, per-
haps especially with respect to birthright citizens. Resident U.S. citizens
sometimes appear to disparage the possibility that individuals could be ig-
norant of their citizenship status and the tax obligations that appear to
some to naturally flow from that status. Yet, among members of the global
birthright diaspora, many do not understand the involuntary nature of
U.S. citizenship. Conventional wisdom aligns with the idea of volition: that
citizenship is a status agreed to rather than conferred.107
Since citizenship as a category defies intuitive grasp, the only persons
who have incontrovertible knowledge of their status are those whose sta-
tus has been confirmed by the U.S. government itself. This is usually ac-
complished by the act of issuing a passport or by allowing the individual to
register to vote. Even a parent’s registration of one’s birth is not sufficient.
Accordingly, while citizenship status is de jure a matter of U.S. legal
precepts, it is de facto a product of official acknowledgement of that status.
This observation leads to the next: citizenship-based taxation also legally
flows from citizenship status by virtue of statutory precepts, yet this fea-
ture of U.S. citizenship it is even less intuitive than citizenship itself.
Worldwide taxation, to the extent that it is even popularly understood,
is associated with residence rather than citizenship around the world.108
Citizenship-based taxation is an anomaly known to and understood well
only by a subset of U.S. tax law experts. Moreover, resident U.S. persons
are not really taxed on the basis of their citizenship alone. They are, along
with all resident non-citizens, subject to tax primarily because their pres-
ence in the territory makes them susceptible to enforcement of law in gen-
eral. For this vast majority of U.S. persons, changing to residence-based
106. Reporting of accounts with U.S. indicia will occur automatically pursuant to the
Canada-US intergovernmental agreement and treaty, as implemented in the Canadian In-
come Tax Act. See Canada-U.S. IGA, supra note 14.
107. Author’s observation from interaction with Accidental Americans and tax compli-
ance experts.
108. REUVEN AVI-YONAH, supra note 18, at 5, 22-24; Mason, supra note 29, at 178-79;
Christians, Drawing the Boundaries, supra note 50, at 59-63.
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taxation would have no impact whatsoever. For those not resident in the
territory, the fact that an obscure and anomalous law applies to them is
anything but obvious.109
B. Obscurity of Principles
It is universally understood that everyone has the right to know what
the law is.110 In practical terms, most U.S. legal doctrines and texts are
routinely accessible to virtually anyone who cares to read them.111 This is
at least in part because of the efforts of scholars like Erwin Griswold, who,
in 1938, called for an act requiring publication of all federal administrative
rules and regulations, in order to ensure that every citizen would be duly
informed about what the law says.112 Yet, something has been overlooked
along the way: namely, that publication may not be enough notice if those
subject to the law do not realize that they are so subject.
Living within a territory under a government presumably provides suf-
ficient notice to the individual that the law of that land governs her ac-
tions.113 Certainly, sovereign nations have overtly and publicly rejected
109. Blum & Singer, supra note 2, at 718 (advocating for the United States to abandon
citizenship-based taxation in favor of residence-based taxation on grounds that the latter “is
more likely to correspond to an individual’s ability to comply and the IRS’s ability to monitor
compliance and which reduces the potential for overlapping taxation”).
110. Conventions against the retroactive application of law reflect the normative
strength of the principle and its implicit inclusion in constitutional law. See, e.g., Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 499, 502, 539-50  (1998) (holding that the retroactive im-
pact of the Coal Act resulted in a taking of private property in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment; in concurring opinions, Justice Kennedy concluded that the Act’s retroactive effects
violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause but not the Takings Clause, while Jus-
tice Thomas thought it might violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, § 9, cl. 3, even if
not the Takings Clause). For a general discussion, see J. L. Huffman, Retroactivity, the Rule of
Law, and the Constitution, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1095 (1999).
111. This is not to imply that reading results in understanding. In addition, some legal
or quasi-legal sources are not available to the public pursuant to policies involving
confidentiality.
112. See generally Erwin N. Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the Law-A Plea for
Better Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198 (1934). Griswold’s forceful
arguments for the obvious need of government to reveal the law to its subjects culminated in
the adoption of the Federal Register Act.
113. This is generally consistent with international law accounts of the jurisdiction to
tax based on the theories of social contract and of sovereignty, even though both theories are
insufficiently theorized in tax literature. For a discussion, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRON-
TIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 21-23 (2007). Whether
such law is legitimate or not is a distinct question. Here, the point is merely that by living
within the territory, the individual is gradually exposed to the fact that the law in that place
governs her actions and that the laws of other places will govern her if she goes to or interacts
with those other places. She gains this exposure through family, neighborhood, community,
culture, and education, so that the government’s duty to inform the individual of her basic
status as a subject of the law is considerably diminished relative to the individual that is not
exposed to these inputs. In the particular case of taxation, the norms of residence-based and
source-based jurisdiction reflect these general intuitions in the sense that states normally
impose their power to tax only on persons who make themselves subject to the jurisdiction
(usually through prolonged presence or the maintenance of personal, family, and economic
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intrusion by other states, and claimed the exclusive right to rule over their
territories and peoples without interference.114 The principle of non-inter-
vention holds constant as a theoretically supportable idea about where in-
dividuals may expect to find sources of authority over their lives. This is so
even if global political and economic interdependence make exclusive sov-
ereign autonomy factually impossible.
An intuitive authority relationship between the individual and the
state does not similarly arise extraterritorially. It is not clear by what basis
individuals may be expected to inform themselves of all of the possible
laws of other states that might apply to them, by virtue of such things as
the circumstances of their birth or lineage.115 Further, it is not clear what
theory applies to explain one state’s right to punish the infractions of its
own domestic rule by the residents of another state, much less why the
second state should assist in carrying out this purpose.116
For those outside the territory, the question of one’s legal status de-
pends on facts and circumstances at the time of birth, choices made
throughout one’s life, and the state of play of various iterations of U.S.
immigration and nationality laws over the years. As a rule, banks and
other financial institutions lack competence to make determinations about
U.S. citizenship; the same is true for other governments. Nevertheless,
with FATCA, the U.S. has deputized these institutions and governments to
make inquiries and collect certifications.
ties) and only on income sources that have some kind of identifiable economic connection to
the jurisdictions, such that they can be said to have “arisen” there. See, e.g., Stimson, supra
note 49, at 155, 159 (exploring the international legal justification for the taxation of alien
residents and the domestic property of alien nonresidents); NUSSBAUM, supra, at 90-99
(same).
114. See Allison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation and the Social Contract, 18 MINN. J.
INT’L L. 99, 105-06 (2009).
115. For example, it seems counterintuitive to expect individuals to intuitively recognize
the need to consult the various legal doctrines of the foreign country or countries of their
parents’ birth, or that of their grandparents, in order to determine whether these countries
might view them as subject to tax and other regulatory obligations. It seems much more
intuitive to expect individuals to consult the laws of foreign jurisdictions for purposes of
seeking recognition of their citizenship, where they sought such citizenship for purposes of
potential migration.
116. To expect otherwise may conflict with the principle that “a state may not exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with
another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (AM. LAW INST. 1986). In comments to this provi-
sion, the American Law Institute (ALI) notes that “links of territoriality or nationality . . .
while generally necessary, are not in all instances sufficient conditions for the exercise of such
jurisdiction.” Id. § 403 cmt. a. Even if the exercise of citizenship-based taxation is reasonable,
which I contend it is not, the cooperation of other jurisdictions is not assured, as the ALI also
notes that in cases of conflicting exercise of jurisdiction, “when an exercise of jurisdiction by
each of two states is not unreasonable, but their regulations conflict,” each state must evalu-
ate the interests  of both states, consult with the other state when possible, and when the
other state “has clearly a greater interest,” should “defer, by abandoning its regulation or
interpreting or modifying it so as to eliminate the conflict.” Id. § 403 cmt. e.
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No normative principle justifies these expectations and consequences.
The contrary must be true: a single nation-state that, at odds with the rest
of the world, purports to exercise an obscure set of rules globally on a class
of people it alone defines defies the intuition of both other states and the
individuals who form the class. The jurisdictional claim therefore warrants
both explanation and meaningful communication initiated by the state,
rather than the other way around. The basic principle is only intensified as
the complexity surrounding membership status and the obligations at-
tached to membership increase, as both certainly have in the United States
over the past several years.
C. Administrative Neglect
From the above observations it follows that it is the state that holds
the duty to inform all those subject to its law that it considers them so
subject, and that it accordingly demands fidelity beyond its territorial
reach. It cannot be the duty of the individual to inform the state that she is
subject to its law. This seems an especially important principle where the
consequence for furnishing the necessary information automatically in-
volves retroactively-applied obligations and onerous processes and fees to
leave.117
Ongoing efforts by the IRS to regulate tax return preparers illustrates
the extent to which lawmakers and administrators appear virtually oblivi-
ous to the international reach of the U.S. tax jurisdiction. Following a U.S.
District Court of Appeals decision, Loving v. IRS,118 which struck down a
mandatory registration regime for paid tax return preparers, the IRS an-
nounced that the same regime would instead be offered as a voluntary
program.119 However, the program explicitly fails to extend to the globally
dispersed population of U.S. taxpayers. For instance, the private test ad-
ministration vendor contracted by the IRS to administer competency tests
for tax return preparers only provides these services in locations within the
United States, despite having a global network of locations upon which it
could potentially draw.120 With a globally dispersed U.S. Person popula-
117. In the context of rules that disallow renunciation of citizenship by a guardian on
behalf of a person that is found to lack the capacity to do so, as described supra notes 83-84,
the claimed jurisdiction is even more suspect.
118. 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
119. National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson noted that the regulation is needed be-
cause evidence is mounting that tax preparers are engaged in rampant error and fraud. Nina
Olsen, The Role of the National Taxpayer Advocate Service in Protecting Taxpayer Rights and
Ensuring a Fair and Just Tax System, CANADIAN TAX FOUNDATION (July 2, 2015), http://
www.ctf.ca/CTFWEB/EN/Conferences_Events/2015/Recordings/15PDMTL_Video.aspx/
(noting the lack of IRS resources dedicated to informing nonresident U.S. Persons of their
U.S. tax and FBAR obligations).
120. IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE REGISTERED TAX RETURN PREPARER TEST:
CANDIDATE INFORMATION BULLETIN 3 (Apr. 16, 2012), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/rtrp-
candidateinfobulletin.pdf; IRS Releases Specifications for Registered Tax Return Preparer
Test, IRS (Sept. 6, 2011), https://www.irs.gov/uac/irs-releases-specifications-for-registered-
tax-return-preparer-test; see also Allison Christians, Regulating Tax Preparers: A Global
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tion, this oversight is significant. In an annual report to Congress regarding
pressing issues for the administration of U.S. tax law, Nina Olson argued
that regulating return preparers is vitally necessary owing to very low un-
derstanding about the U.S. tax system within the United States.121 There is
reason to expect even less understanding in other countries. The remote-
ness of the nonresident population increases their risk of exposure to
fraud and incompetence, yet the IRS appears unwilling to expend the re-
sources necessary to serve the full population of U.S. Persons.
III. CITIZENSHIP-BASED TAXATION REJECTED
The foregoing discussion demonstrates why the United States cannot
unilaterally enforce worldwide taxation strictly on grounds of citizenship
on individuals who reside permanently in other countries. The only way
for the United States to accomplish this goal is by receiving extensive as-
sistance from other countries in, at the latter’s expense, identifying their
own residents (including their own nationals and citizens) as subjects of a
foreign state.122
In (intentionally or not) designing FATCA to force foreign in-
termediaries and ultimately governments to identify its nonresident citizen
population for the first time in history, the United States is demanding an
entirely unprecedented scope of assistance from other nations. For an-
other country to agree to lend such assistance with respect to their own
nationals and residents is controversial and unwarranted for at least two
reasons having to do with international law. First, to lend such assistance is
to significantly depart from an otherwise globally accepted standards sur-
rounding the bases for and limits of a jurisdiction to assert a right to tax.
Second, to lend such assistance is to ignore a breach of the principle of
nonintervention among sovereign states.
These departures from international law are not justified to meet the
ends of citizenship-based taxation—certainly, no justifications have been
put forward for public debate among nations.123 Accordingly, the United
Problem for the IRS, 75 TAX NOTES INT’L 391, 391-92 (2014) [hereinafter Christians, Regulat-
ing Tax Preparers).
121. Olsen, supra note 119, at 1 (“[F]ew taxpayers today can confidently say they un-
derstand the tax code or even that they have correctly computed their tax liabilities.”).
122. The following discussion is silent with respect to the duty of other nations to volun-
tarily accept the task of enforcing FATCA with respect to U.S. residents. As noted above, in
prior work I have suggested that such enforcement would be justified if certain conditions,
involving principles of reciprocity and comity of nations, are met. See generally Christians,
supra note 10. Such principles would be met where the United States to agree to implement
the common reporting standard developed by the OECD as described infra text at note 150.
To date, the United States has not done so. See CRS by Jurisdiction, OECD, https://
www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-implementation-and-assistance/crs-by-jurisdiction/
(last updated Jan. 17, 2017) (listing the 101 jurisdictions that have agreed to the common
reporting standard to date).
123. Ignoring these departures from precedent and principle creates uncertainty for fu-
ture international tax relations, since no justifications have been made by the United States
or any of its FATCA partners. Some observers may point to general principles supporting tax
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States should abandon citizenship-based taxation in the face of its many
violations of law as well as norms of justice. However, other countries are
not required to wait for reform by U.S. lawmakers. Instead, they may de-
cline to provide information in furtherance of U.S. citizenship-based tax
law in cases involving their own residents and nationals.124
This action would not be unprecedented: the United States has, in the
past, reformed a regime that was similarly viewed as incompatible with
international tax standards and extraterritorial in scope, after being met
with appropriate international and national pressure.125 That situation, in-
volving an effort by one state (California) to require global reporting of
profits by certain entities doing business in the jurisdiction, serves as pre-
cedent for a global restraint in the enforcement of FATCA on non-US
residents because it draws multiple parallels with citizenship-based taxa-
tion including the international law violations raised herein.126
The dual prongs of the international law case against the foreign en-
forcement of citizenship-based taxation through FATCA are discussed in
turn, however a preliminary note of context is in order. The discussion that
information exchange among countries as the justification for countries to accede to FATCA
but that is true only with respect to its application to U.S. residents, since global tax informa-
tion exchange standards followed by the rest of the world are explicitly based on residence
and not citizenship. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(OECD), STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION
IN TAX MATTERS 6-7, 13 (2014), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/auto-
matic-exchange-financial-account-information-common-reporting-standard.pdf [hereinafter,
COMMON REPORTING STANDARD] (explaining that the FATCA regime “deviates” from the
global standard because of the U.S. exercise of citizenship-based taxation, and setting out
model language for bilateral agreements to exchange tax information only with respect to
persons who are identified as resident in the relevant jurisdictions).
124. While many countries have already undertaken to enforce FATCA within their
jurisdictions by means of an intergovernmental agreement, these agreements are, with few
exceptions, signed in furtherance of existing treaty obligations regarding the exchange of
information, which are subject to internal public policy restrictions. See, e.g., Canada-U.S.
IGA, supra note 14 (agreeing to certain terms of information exchange pursuant to the ex-
isting Canada-U.S. Double Tax Convention). The information exchange provisions of all U.S.
treaties follow the U.S. Model Tax Convention, which states that the treaty partners will
exchange information that is relevant to the tax administration. U.S. Model Convention
(2015), art. 26, at para 1. Such exchange is subject to a broad condition, however: the obliga-
tion to transfer information does not impose any obligation to supply information “the dis-
closure of which would be contrary to public policy (ordre public).” Id. at para. 3. The United
States itself has, presumably under this provision, expressed its intention not to furnish infor-
mation pursuant to its undertaking in any IGA where the U.S. Treasury deems that doing so
would violate internal U.S. conditions respecting taxpayer confidentiality. For a discussion,
see Allison Christians, Interpretation or Override? Introducing the Hybrid Tax Agreement, 80
TAX NOTES INT’L 51, 52-53 (Oct. 5, 2015). It would be consistent with the underlying treaties
for other countries to exercise the same prerogative, restricting information transfers with
respect to their own residents under the longstanding and universally accepted policy that
residence is the proper basis for worldwide taxation of individuals.
125. See infra Part A, describing global resistance, including threat of retaliation, to
California’s worldwide unitary method for income allocation involving multinationals, which
resulted in conciliatory domestic law reforms.
126. See infra Part C.
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follows confines itself to certain general principles of international law,
and does not attempt to analyze how a particular country’s courts might
analyze the issues presented. At the same time, it draws heavily on U.S.
international legal principles and sources on grounds that U.S. under-
standing of international law respecting the enforcement of extraterritorial
obligations may be relevant in a dispute surrounding the foreign enforce-
ment of citizenship-based taxation.
A. Violation of Customary Law
As outlined in Part I, the residence and source principles are so widely
understood as the foundations of income taxation as a viable tax in the
context of a world of economic, social, and political integration, they may
constitute customary international law. Whether this is an accurate
description is the subject of ongoing academic debate that does not appear
to have been resolved by courts. It will likely be tested, even if only implic-
itly, in the application of FATCA to individual cases, because, to the ex-
tent it acts as a mechanism to implement worldwide taxation by one state
of the residents and citizens of another, FATCA sets states up to violate
these international law principles to the detriment of their own peoples.127
As a clear deviation from global tax norms, citizenship-based taxation of
nonresidents, as enforced by FATCA, does not create legitimate obliga-
tions on the part of other states.128
127. And in some cases, their own tax expenditures. The current taxation by the United
States of income associated with non-U.S. trusts is illustrative: these rules entitle the United
States to a portion of the contributions made directly by foreign governments to the regis-
tered education and disability savings schemes of their own nationals and residents. For a
discussion, see Letter from American Institute of CPAs to U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Proposed
Tax Relief for Various United States and Canadian Equivalent Purpose Deferred Tax Savings
Plans (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.aicpa.org/Advocacy/Tax/DownloadableDocuments/2016-
03-04-comments-on-proposed-tax-relief-us-can-equivalent-purpose-def-tax-savings-plans.pdf.
128. Contemporary scholarship notes that “the ‘sovereignty’ of states has . . . become
understood to be reflected in and constrained by rules of jurisdiction which define the limits
of the powers of coexisting ‘sovereigns’, in particular, the scope of regulatory authority of
states in international law.” Alex Mills, Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law, 84 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 187, 194 (2014). This view is associated with contemporary understanding re-
garding the relationship between states operating in a fundamentally cooperative interna-
tional society. See, e.g., Cees Peters, ON THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 35
(2013). It is a view that has been adopted, if implicitly, by the OECD. See OECD, REPORT
ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES 15 (1998) (“Countries should remain free to design their own
tax systems as long as they abide by internationally accepted standards in doing so”); Edwin
van der Bruggen, State Responsibility Under Customary International Law in Matters of Taxa-
tion and Tax Competition, 29 INTERTAX 115, 116 (2000) (exploring the OECD’s efforts to
frame the rights of jurisdictions to use tax rules that inflict harm on others). Accordingly, the
classic-positivist view of statehood, which ascribes no limits to the tax jurisdiction other than
that set by the state itself, is rejected to the extent it implies any duty on the part of other
countries in respect of their own taxpayers). For some examples of the classic view, see Stan-
ley S. Surrey, Current Issues in the Taxation of Foreign Corporate Investment, 56 COLUM. L.
REV. 815, 817 (1956) (stating that “the assertion of jurisdiction is essentially a matter of
national policy and national attitudes” not restricted by law); Martin Norr, Jurisdiction to Tax
and International Income, 17 TAX L. REV. 431, 431 (1962) (stating that “[n]o rules of interna-
tional law exist to limit the extent of any country’s tax jurisdiction” and that “a country is free
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In order to proceed with the argument that other states are free to
decline to enforce U.S. citizenship-based taxation with respect to their
own nationals and residents, the problem of possible acquiescence must be
confronted. That is, the United States has statutorily claimed its right to
tax citizens for the entirety of the life of the income tax.129 Moreover, it
has included clear language in its double tax treaties preserving these
rights.130 If residence and source constitute customary law, any resistance
to citizenship-based taxation on grounds of its incompatibility with inter-
national norms and standards might seem impossible in a world that has
tacitly accepted the persistent position of the United States in claiming this
right. To overcome this issue requires a closer look at the doctrines of
customary law and persistent objection.
Customary international law is characterized by two fundamental ele-
ments: states uniformly comply with it (sometimes referred to as the objec-
tive element), and they do so out of a sense of legal obligation (sometimes
referred to as the subjective element).131 The role of each of these require-
ments in determining whether something is a customary law is the subject
of extensive analysis in the international law literature.132
While customary law may be considered binding on states, there is an
exception for so-called “persistent objectors,” or states that, before a prac-
tice develops into a rule of general law, “persistently and openly” dissent
from the rule.133 The argument thus may be advanced that the United
States is a persistent objector to the residence and source principles as
evidenced by its long-standing statutory claim of jurisdiction over citizens
regardless of residence or source. It is not clear, however, whether claim-
staking with only minimal and sporadic enforcement in the case of nonres-
idents is sufficient to constitute persistent objection. Whether a claim that
persists in law but also faces the impossibility of unilateral enforcement for
to adopt whatever rules of tax jurisdiction it chooses”); Harold Wurzel, Foreign Investment
and Extraterritorial Taxation, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 812, 814 (1938) (stating that “taxing
power stems from sovereignty and sovereignty is omnipotence” and denying the existence of
“anything in the written or unwritten law of nations” to limit the jurisdiction to tax, based on
the lack of any such articulation by international tax law scholars and policymakers to that
date).
129. As described by Mason, supra note 29, at 182; see also Surrey, supra note 128, at
815 (“From the very start of the modem income tax the United States has asserted jurisdic-
tion to tax on the basis of two factors-citizenship and source of income.”).
130. See, e.g., U.S. Model Double Tax Convention art. 1, para. 4 (stating that “this Con-
vention shall not affect the taxation by a Contracting State of its residents . . . and its
citizens”).
131. See, e.g., INT’L LAW ASS’N COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT’L
LAW, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOM-
ARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (LONDON CONFERENCE) 7 (2000); Michael Byers, Introduction:
Power, Obligation, and Customary International Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 81, 83
(2001).
132. Customary international law is described as binding even on those states that had
no part in forming it, “because they choose to acknowledge its obligatory character.” INT’L
LAW ASS’N COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT’L LAW, supra note 131, at 30.
133. Id. at 4, 27.
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most of its existence can fulfill the requirements associated with persistent
objection appears to be a matter that has not been addressed by courts.
The right to tax on the basis of citizenship is sometimes described as
arising from the international recognition of the state’s prescriptive or leg-
islative jurisdiction based on nationality, which is said to reflect “ideas of
individual subjectivity to sovereign power.”134 According to this view,
state regulatory power derives from the relationship between the individ-
ual as a subject and a sovereign, and therefore travels with the individual
wherever she may go.135 However, nationality-based obligations are in
conflict not only with more contemporary views that volition of the indi-
vidual is necessary to create a link to a state, but also with other explicitly
undertaken duties of states, such as to guard against discrimination on the
basis of nationality.136
Thus, even if the international community (or a court) were to ac-
knowledge the right of the United States to unilaterally extend its jurisdic-
tion over citizens, the consequences for other countries are not clear. One
state’s asserted “right” to tax beyond the internationally agreed standard,
even if acknowledged as within the scope of its sovereign reach, does not
by itself outline the duties of other states to yield, thus “subject[ing] their
nationals willingly to other states’ jurisdiction.”137 Even if the United
States has a right to tax individuals based on their nationality or citizen-
ship, it does not automatically follow that other states are obligated to
locate individuals who may be U.S. citizens for the sole purpose of making
134. Mills, supra note 128, at 196. The other main jurisdictional basis is territoriality,
which is said to “reflect the intimate connection between territorial control and statehood in
international law.” Id.
135. See, e.g., id. at 198. This view, sometimes called the “active personality principle,”
explains why a state may regulate the conduct of its nationals regardless of their territorial
location, for example as in the case of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. See, e.g.,
Adefolake Adeyeye, Foreign Bribery Gaps and Sealants: International Standards and Domes-
tic Implementation, 15 BUS. L. INT’L. 169, 178 (2014). However, international law scholars
note that the power to regulate nationals extra-territorially is typically reserved to serious
crimes. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 128, at 198. While Mills acknowledges citizenship-based
taxation as an exception to this rule, he offers no theoretical, normative, or legal justification
therefor. Id.
136. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 128, at 206 (citing the law of the European Union and
the European Convention on Human Rights as well as investment treaties as possible sources
of conflict).
137. BOLL, supra note 43, at 303. That rights imply correlative duties is indisputable, but
the question is which duties are implied by which rights. See, e.g., ANTHONY A. D’AMATO,
THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (1971) (stating that “a claim of ‘right’
can only make sense if the claimant is asserting implicitly that others have a ‘duty’ to allow or
accede to this claim”). In the context of citizenship-based taxation, the United States is mak-
ing a claim that it has a right to legislate within its competence free from interference from
other states. This claim is implicitly a claim that other states, in acknowledging that right (by
treaty or otherwise), agree not to interfere with attempts by the United States to enforce its
own jurisdiction. However that agreement in no way implies the further agreement that other
states have a duty to assist the United States in legislating where it is unable to do so alone.
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the United States aware of their existence so that it can begin taxing
them.138
Instead, doubt as to the obligations of other states arises owing to past
U.S. practice. Before FATCA, the United States never asserted that other
countries owed it a positive duty to identify U.S. taxpayers among their
own populations. In fact, the United States has actively sought to prevent
other countries from taxing their own nationals or former nationals who
became U.S. residents, describing the taxation of a person “elsewhere
domiciled and elsewhere a citizen” as “internationally void,” and finding a
right to appeal to the U.S. State Department for diplomatic assistance to
prevent such taxation where the other state attempted to extract the taxes
due by turning to the taxpayer’s relatives.139  In the case of nonresident
dual nationals, at least, a U.S. request for a foreign government to imple-
ment FATCA is a request to facilitate the opposite of what the State De-
partment apparently believes to be within the sovereign right of other
nations.
Beyond this particular example, it is clear that residence and source
are the universally accepted factors to link a person or her property to a
territory for tax purposes, and that the superior claims of residence and
source demonstrate the weakness of the citizenship-based taxation claim
by comparison.140 To the extent that residence and source-based taxation
constitute customary international law, we may thus conclude from his-
138. This question of a state’s duty to respond to the asserted tax rights of another is a
novel one that does not fit neatly within the existing scholarship on the limits of the jurisdic-
tion to tax in international law. The scholarship has mainly focused on identifying and ex-
plaining the boundaries of the sovereign power, rather than identifying and explaining the
scope of potential duties among sovereigns to each other when it comes to taxation. For a
discussion, see Christians, supra note 114, at 105-06.
139. J.B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. III, 691-92 (describing the
U.S. State Department’s rejection of the right of Turkey to impose taxation on a former
Turkish citizen and resident who located to the United States, and stating that “an attempt to
execute [such taxation] by penalties on the relatives of the party taxed gives the [party] taxed
a right of appeal for diplomatic intervention to the Government to which he owes alle-
giance”). This is consistent with the individual’s right to diplomatic protection in regards to
their status as multiple nationals. See, e.g., BOLL, supra note 43, at 301; see also Peter J. Spiro,
Embracing Dual Nationality, in DUAL NATIONALITY, SOCIAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL CITI-
ZENSHIP IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE: THE REINVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP 22-26 (2002).
140. Mills, for example, argues that “individual autonomy is increasingly recognized as
playing an important role in questions of jurisdiction,” and that rather than nationality alone
being sufficient to claim a person as subject to the state, “the practice of states instead sup-
ports the idea that a jurisdiction may be based on a flexible combination of both territorial
and personal connecting factors,” as I suggest would be the case for residence- and source-
based taxation, as described supra at note 51. See Mills, supra note 128, at 207. The argument
that residence is entitled to more weight than nationality in taxation accords with the same
principle in general theories of sovereignty and jurisdiction. See, e.g., BOLL, supra note 43, at
290-93 (outlining the “presumption that jurisdiction is first and foremost territorial” and ex-
plaining that, given the fact that multiple nationality is increasingly common around the
world, if nationality were the primary basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over persons, sig-
nificant and irresolvable international law problems would result; instead, nationality relies
on a connection with territoriality as the basis for jurisdiction).
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tory, practice, and theory that citizenship-based taxation is not customary
law, and that it is incompatible with customary law when applied to non-
residents. To the extent that residence and source are not customary inter-
national law, we may conclude from history, practice, and theory that
citizenship-based taxation has an even weaker claim to positive affirma-
tion by other states.
Citizenship-based taxation is not only different than residence and
source based taxation, but it interferes with those jurisdictions that base
their taxing power on residence and source. Rejecting citizenship-based
taxation as it applies to the residents of other countries would thus reject
what may be a violation of customary international law while simultane-
ously according with the view that a states’ right to tax is generally ac-
cepted as not exclusive but conjunctive—it must be exercised in a way that
minimally interferes with the regulatory processes and goals of other
states. This idea accords with the international law principle of noninter-
vention, as discussed in the next section.141
B. Violation of Principle of NonIntervention
The rightful claim of the state over revenues (through taxation or oth-
erwise) has been a matter of vigorous public debate throughout the history
of the nation state.142 Involving, as it does, an assertion of one jurisdiction
as against all others in the international society of states, any claim of one
state to a superior right to tax seems fundamentally incompatible with a
world in which people and resources are subject to equally compelling ju-
risdictional claims.143 The clash of jurisdictions on income tax matters has
traditionally been resolved through diplomatic means. But in the case of
FATCA, an additional element has been introduced, namely: economic
141. See, e.g., F. A. MANN, FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1990) (stating
that “[s]ince every State enjoys the same degree of sovereignty, jurisdiction implies respect
for the corresponding rights of other States”). The principle of nonintervention is a limit on
the extraterritorial enforcement of law, which has been viewed by some scholars as “the
prime regulator of the exercise by a state of its freedom in fiscal regulation.” A. H. Qureshi,
The Freedom of a State to Legislate in Fiscal Matters Under General International Law, 41
BULL.  INT’L FISC. DOC. 14, 21 (1987); see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 113, at 16, 19 (confirm-
ing Qureshi’s view as broadly held).
142. See, e.g., Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Crisis of the Tax State (1918), in INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC PAPERS, No. 4, (Stolper, Turvey & Henderson eds., Stolper & Musgrave
trans., 1953)
In some historical periods the immediate formative influence of the fiscal needs
and policy of the state on the development of the economy and with it on all forms
of life and all aspects of culture explains practically all the major features of events;
in most periods it explains a great deal and there are but a few periods when it
explains nothing.
143. See, e.g., CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED
STATES AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 21 (2007) (“The term ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction’ is
often used to condemn the long arm of US law. . . The United States are perceived to cham-
pion a geographically almost unlimited application of their own ‘exceptional’ legislation, a
perception which is stoked by US unilateralism in world politics. . . .”).
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penalties to induce nonresidents and ultimately foreign governments to
accede to the unilateral demand of the United States for information re-
specting U.S Persons as defined in U.S. tax law.
The United States has offered scant justification for imposing this
threat of economic penalty on all the nations of the world. Instead, it is
clear that the penalty is imposed on the strength of its exclusive power
over the global currency of last reserve. However, applying economic pres-
sure on foreign states to achieve national aims is a clear violation of the
principle of nonintervention, which holds that every sovereign state must
be entitled to regulate without undue interference by other states.
That principle is embodied in the Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The resolution was
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1970 without a vote, indicating
consensus and alignment of all UN members, including the United
States.144 The resolution states that no state has the right to intervene in
the internal or external affairs of other states, and that all forms of inter-
ference or attempted threat, including economic threats, are in violation of
international law.145 Further, the resolution states that “[n]o State may use
or encourage the use of economic . . . measures to coerce another State in
order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign
rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.”146 The prohibition
against force is thus not limited to physical threats but extends to any coer-
cive action and even the encouragement of such action.
The right of states to nonintervention is perhaps the most straightfor-
ward and familiar principle attending to the general concept of sovereignty
as a status formed in international law. It has been described as “one of
the most potent and elusive of all international principles.”147 An exten-
sive literature has developed in both international law and political theory
(among other disciplines) that explores the limits of nonintervention in the
context of violations of globally accepted principles and norms.148 Consis-
144. See, e.g., ALAN VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (2007).
145. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, Declarations on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter, U.N. Declaration on Interna-
tional Law Principles] (the Preamble explains that “strict observance by States of the obliga-
tion not to intervene in the affairs of any other State is an essential condition to ensure that
nations live together in peace with one another,” since intervention violates the Charter and
creates “situations which threaten international peace and security”).
146. Id. ¶ 1.
147. LOWE, supra note 144, at 104.
148. See, e.g., A. V. Lowe, International Law Issues Arising in the “Pipeline” Dispute:
the British Position, 27 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 54, 56 (1986) (“Arguments in favour of a
presumption of a legality for extra-territorial legislative jurisdiction have been so widely and
heavily criticised on grounds of legal principle and logic that it would be difficult to rest any
claim upon the presumption alone.”); see also A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 263 (1981); MANN,
supra note 141, at 26.
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tent among the various accounts of foundational international legal princi-
ples and theories of justice is the observation that even in cases of human
rights violations, some of which have been extreme, states have engaged in
forcible intervention and economic sanction only “in a very small number
of cases.”149
To date there appears to have been no international debate on the
justification for the use of economic pressure to compel worldwide accept-
ance of FATCA, and with it the enforcement of citizenship-based taxation
on residents and nationals of other countries. The fact that states have
rights to independence and self-determination obviously does not mean
that one state can actually stop another from interfering with it as a practi-
cal matter, but it does give grounds for principled legal resistance where
necessary to protect the state and its people from external harms. National
courts would be justified in invoking such principles to restrict the applica-
tion of FATCA to their own residents.
At the very least, other governments need not tacitly accept citizen-
ship-based taxation by embedding enabling principles in international con-
sensus documents, as the OECD recently did in its articulation of a
“common reporting standard,” the global version of FATCA.150  In the
common reporting standard, the OECD has adopted a global regime for
the gathering and exchange of tax information among countries that is
fundamentally premised on the residence principle.151 Yet, the OECD has
included birthplace as a relevant data point to be collected and exchanged
by all countries.152 Birthplace is irrelevant to the residence principle and is
of practical interest primarily to the United States.153 The inclusion of
birthplace as a tax-relevant data point is even more aggravating given that
the United States is not a party to the Common Reporting Standard and
has indicated its ongoing intention not to join the regime.154
149. NUSSBAUM, supra note 113, at 256-57.
150. See, e.g., Kristen Parillo, U.S. Position on OECD Standard Problematic for Trusts
and Funds, 148 TAX NOTES 727, 727-28 (Aug. 17, 2015) (explaining the relationship between
FATCA and the common reporting standard).
151. See OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT IN-
FORMATION IN TAX MATTERS 29-31 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-informa
tion/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-account-information-for-tax-matters-9789
264216525-en.htm.
152. Id. § 2, para. 2.
153. Possibly Eritrea as well, though its claims have been impeded by other states. See
supra note 54.
154. See, e.g., Parillo, supra note 150, at 727-28 (outlining the Treasury’s official position
that since the common reporting standard “would not have happened . . . were it not for
FATCA,” the failure of the United States to sign on to the standard should be accepted by
the international community, and that the United States is committed to bilateral informa-
tion exchange on its own terms); OECD, AEOI: STATUS OF COMMITMENTS (July 26, 2016),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/AEOI-commitments.pdf (excluding the United States
from its list of jurisdictions that have committed to the common reporting standard and stat-
ing in a footnote that “[t]he United States . . . is undertaking automatic information ex-
changes pursuant to FATCA,” that it acknowledges “the need . . . to achieve equivalent levels
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Relatedly, and also conspicuously absent from public discourse on
FATCA, is a discussion regarding the purpose of subjecting nonresident
individuals to an extensive global disclosure regime if the ultimate taxation
thereof typically will be frustrated by other international laws. Frustration
is likely because even in the event the United States assesses taxes, inter-
est, or penalties on a non-resident, no foreign government is under an obli-
gation to lend assistance in collecting such amounts from its own resident
citizens. This observation may flow from the nonintervention principle laid
out above, but it is also captured in the so-called “revenue rule.”
In brief, the revenue rule holds that “[o]ne nation does not take notice
of the revenue laws of another.”155 Despite occasional calls to abandon
the revenue rule by some scholars,156 the law is consistent with the princi-
ple of nonintervention and abandoning it would require careful analysis of
the potential negative as well as positive effects. The OECD Multilateral
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters includes
provisions for assistance in collection that would circumvent the revenue
rule as to certain taxpayers and transactions.157 The United States entered
a reservation on this provision when it signed the treaty in 1989, and has
signed but not ratified the 2010 Protocol without altering its
reservations.158
In the context of the revenue rule, the entire exercise of FATCA when
applied to permanent residents of other countries appears to be legally
futile if it does not also create enforceable obligations on the part of the
targeted population. Receiving asset and income information about its citi-
zens residing in another jurisdiction will help the United States create tax
assessments, but it does not necessarily entitle the United States to seize
of reciprocal automatic information exchange with partner jurisdictions,” and that it has “a
political commitment” to adopt the necessary regulations to do so).
155. Planche v. Fletcher, (1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 164, 165; see also Holman v. Johnson
(1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (‘‘No country ever takes notice of the revenue law of
another.’’).
156. See, e.g., Samuel D. Brunson, Accept This as a Gift: Unilaterally Enforcing Foreign
Tax Judgments, 146 TAX NOTES 541, 543 (2015) (advocating that the United States abandon
the revenue rule so as to end its ability to aid or abet tax evasion by foreign nationals).
157. See The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Mat-
ters, entered into force June 1, 2011, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 2012 112-5, E.T.S. No. 127, [herein-
after MAATM], http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/ENG-Amended-
Convention.pdf.
158. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 113TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PRO-
POSED PROTOCOL AMENDING THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRA-
TIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS 3 (2014).
Ratification of the protocol is not intended to alter the reservation of rights or
declarations of understanding that the United States made when it ratified the
existing convention in 1991 . . . . [T]he United States reserved the right not to
provide (1) assistance for taxes imposed by possessions, political subdivisions, or
local authorities of other parties to the convention; (2) tax collection assistance; or
(3) assistance in serving documents (except the service of documents by mail). The
reservations are reciprocal; to the same extent that the United States will not pro-
vide assistance, other parties need not assist the United States.
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assets (or ultimately persons) in the foreign territory. To conclude other-
wise appears to fly squarely in the face of the U.N. Declaration on Princi-
ples of International Law, as well as general principles of justice.159
There is no outward indication that the lawmakers behind FATCA
intended to bring about a radical departure from the principles of non-
intervention and sovereign authority over a territory. If a radical depar-
ture from these principles was or is being sought, an international discus-
sion on the merits of such a policy shift would appear to be a necessary
prerequisite to actions that lead in this direction. It is difficult to imagine
that the lack of equal reciprocity, which has characterized the information
flow in U.S. intergovernmental agreements on FATCA to date, would sim-
ilarly be acceptable in the context of collection enforcement.160
Other countries are under no obligation to accept and facilitate an
asymmetrical international tax system, in which the United States imposes
demands on other governments that are inconsistent with both interna-
tional legal standards and the principle of nonintervention.161 As evi-
denced by the international embrace of the common reporting standard,
most agree with the idea that nations should share tax-relevant informa-
tion in order to maintain the integrity of residence-based taxation.162
However, the extension of information sharing to expose previously un-
suspecting taxpayers to the United States government by virtue of their
presumed citizenship alone is a unique feature of the U.S. tax system that
is not consistent with that goal. The following part suggests that there is
precedent for other countries to respond to this inconsistency with appro-
priate concern and pressure.
C. Precedent for International Response
In the mid 1980s, the state of California faced a concerted global back-
lash against a tax practice viewed as impermissibly extraterritorial in
159. See generally PETER DIETSCH, CATCHING CAPITAL: THE ETHICS OF TAX COMPETI-
TION 167-87 (2015) (exploring the boundaries of acceptable state tax practices consistent with
principles of fundamental justice, including the membership principle and the right to self-
determination).
160. See, e.g., Parillo, supra note 150, at 728 (explaining that “U.S. law currently doesn’t
require U.S. financial institutions to collect some of the information that foreign financial
institutions are required to collect under FATCA and the CRS,” and that the Obama admin-
istration has been unsuccessful in achieving necessary reforms to date despite promises made
in intergovernmental FATCA agreements).
161. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 115, 130 (2005-2006) (stating that “[w]hen a state violates international law, there is
generally no expectation that all states will band together to punish the violator. Rather,
states affected by the violation may choose to take some sort of retaliatory action”).
162. CRS by Jurisdiction, supra note 122 (listing 101 jurisdictions that have committed
to the common reporting standard).
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scope163 as well as inconsistent with international tax norms.164 The rule at
issue was California’s “worldwide unitary method,” which required certain
businesses in California to measure their corporate income for tax pur-
poses according to a formula that required tax-relevant information to be
collected from global affiliates and disclosed to California’s tax
authority.165
Like citizenship-based taxation, California’s regime required taxpay-
ers to annually submit disclosures of their income and assets on a global
basis.166 Unlike citizenship-based taxation, the state regime then applied a
formula under which only the California-source portion of such income
would be subject to taxation by the state.167 Yet nations around the world
aligned together in vehement opposition to California’s regime as it ap-
plied to their own resident companies, ultimately compelling California to
restrict its jurisdiction to its territory.
The arguments for and against California’s regime as applied to non-
resident taxpayers parallel many of those raised in defense of and against
citizenship-based taxation. For example, California advanced the argu-
ment that, as a matter of jurisdictional sovereignty, it should be entitled to
design its own tax policy free from interference by other jurisdictions.168
Proponents of the system expressed their belief that an alternative tax de-
sign would lead to tax avoidance—in that case, the alternative being the
arms’ length standard employed by the United States and most of its trad-
163. Statement of Allen Wallis, FINAL REPORT OF THE WORLDWIDE UNITARY TAXA-
TION WORKING GROUP (Aug. 31, 1984), reprinted in 24 TAX NOTES 1043, 1063 (Sept. 10,
1984) [hereinafter, UNITARY TAX GROUP REPORT] (stating that “the unitary tax method
leads inevitably to extraterritorial and double taxation” and “allows a state to reach beyond
its borders and tax higher profits earned elsewhere”). Wallis further expounded his view that
“the unitary tax method is contrary to international practice” by making the case that arms’
length transfer pricing should be viewed as an international standard owing to widespread
practice and “years of effort” by all the OECD member nations.” Id.
164. The U.S. Treasury convened a task force to “examine the taxation problem in its
broadest aspects, as regards multinational corporations, whether foreign or domestic . . . and
the implications . . . on our international relationships . . . as well as on states’ revenues and
states’ rights.” Id. at 1043, 1047.
165. The regime is a key component of combined reporting and formulary apportion-
ment, which is a method of allocating income across the members of a group of controlled or
affiliated companies. Combined reporting and formulary apportionment, while in common
usage across the several states, is an alternative to the arm’s-length method, which is favored
for federal corporate income tax purposes by the United States as well most of its major
trading partners. For an overview of the regime and a contemporary argument in favor of
continuing jurisdictional limits on tax information reporting, see generally Todd Roberts &
Joel Walters, In Defense of Water’s-Edge Reporting, TAX NOTES INT’L. 885 (Sept. 5, 2016).
166. See CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, CALIFORNIA’S CORPORATION TAXES-
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2003), https://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/misc/1083.pdf (ex-
plaining that California’s unitary method formula “takes into account . . . worldwide prop-
erty, payroll, and sales factors”).
167. Id. (explaining that the business income of a unitary business is “divided and as-
signed to California by means of an apportionment formula”).
168. UNITARY TAX GROUP REPORT, supra note 163, at 1046 (“[T]he states believe that
they should be free from federal interference in establishing their fiscal systems.”).
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ing partners.169 They further defended compliance burdens faced dispro-
portionately by non-US based taxpayers on grounds that it is more
difficult to get accurate information from them.170 Finally, California ar-
gued that alternative methods of taxation are not necessarily international
standards because in practice, jurisdictions do not implement them uni-
formly.171 All of these arguments ultimately proved insufficient to support
California’s regime in the face of widespread opposition from the interna-
tional community, yet very similar arguments are advanced in support of
citizenship based taxation.172
Conversely, constituents who sought reform of California’s regime ex-
pressed concerns regarding the likelihood of over- and under-taxation, the
vast complexity and even “bewildering” nature of the rules as they applied
to non-US taxpayers, the likelihood for interference with international
trade and investment flows, and the disproportionate compliance costs for,
and other impacts on, non-US based taxpayers as compared to those based
in the United States.173 All of these arguments apply equally to the appli-
cation of citizenship-based taxation to nonresidents. Indeed, the argu-
ments are strongest in the case of Accidental Americans, who for reasons
beyond their control are included in a tax system they consider foreign, in
contrast to the multinationals whose exposure to the California tax system
came about because they voluntarily sought to access the market.
The positions taken in respect of California’s tax system are particu-
larly instructive, even if not dispositive about the limits of the state’s juris-
diction to tax.174 The parallels with citizenship-based taxation affirm some
of the grounds for other states to resist citizenship-based taxation on
grounds of incompatibility with both global tax standards and the principle
of non-intervention. At the same time, important differences between the
affected constituencies may explain some of the reasons why such resis-
tance has not yet materialized, and may be unlikely to materialize.
One glaring distinction should be noted, since it seems to have been
key to achieving reforms. In the case of California’s worldwide unitary tax,
multiple heads of state from key trading partners voiced uniformly strong
objections, pointing out the perceived interference with their own jurisdic-
169. Id. at 1046.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1048.
172. See generally Mason, supra note 29 (reviewing the arguments in favor of citizen-
ship based tax).
173. UNITARY TAX GROUP REPORT, supra note 163, at 1046-48 (describing foreign-
based multinationals objections to the compliance burdens of California’s system, including
especially the “need to translate their entire foreign operations into U.S. currency and to
conform them to U.S. accounting rules”). This burden in particular is replicated for nonresi-
dent citizens as to their entire financial lives, a hardship that is compounded by their fewer
resources and access to competent professionals at affordable cost compared to multination-
als that expressly sought to do business in California.
174. As discussed below, rather than press the issue in litigation, California undertook
to voluntarily resolve the issues through legislative reform.
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tions and threatening retaliation in the form of sanctions.175 Similarly,
global business interests railed in unison against California’s system, call-
ing for federal intervention to “provide adequately for the international
pressures” should the state fail to remedy the situation.176 A working
group was formed to study the broad domestic and international impacts
of California’s regime on US international relations as well as states’ reve-
nues and rights.177 The working group convened multiple meetings and
included multiple stakeholders, who deliberated at length over the com-
peting interests at stake.178
There has been no similar international outcry by foreign officials, no
concerted determination to retaliate on behalf of their own resident tax-
payers, in the case of citizenship based taxation. No working group has
been convened to study the issues attending to how FATCA enforces citi-
zenship taxation of nonresidents, and no public meetings have been held
among officials and those impacted by the laws to discuss and deliberate
the international implications, revenues, and rights involved.
The reason for the disparate reaction of the international community
in these two cases appears obviously related to the resources of the respec-
tive affected constituencies. Major multinational firms were the aggrieved
parties in the case of the California worldwide unitary system. They under-
standably acted in their own interests, and they sought the assistance of
governments to further their cause.179 In contrast, citizenship taxation im-
pacts individuals of varying means, with less ability to marshal the forces
of their governments to rally on their behalf in the face of overwhelming
pressure to comply.180
Ultimately, under pressure from within the state, by other states, by
business groups, and by the federal government,181 California amended its
laws in response to complaints from the international community that its
175. See UNITARY TAX GROUP REPORT, supra note 163, at 1063 (noting “sharp criti-
cism from all of our major trading partners,” with the Secretary of State stating that “few
issues have provoked so broad and intense a reaction from foreign nations” and that the
United States received diplomatic notes from fourteen OECD countries and the OECD it-
self, “all protesting against the application of the unitary tax method to their companies”).
176. STATEMENT BY THE BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES ON THE WORLDWIDE UNITARY
TAXATION WORKING GROUP, May 1, 1984, reprinted in 24 TAX NOTES 1043, 1065 (Sept. 10,
1984).
177. UNITARY TAX GROUP REPORT, supra note 163, at 1047.
178. Id. at 1047, 1051.
179. For example, those seeking reform of California’s system called for “special em-
phasis” regarding the economic effects attendant to furthering a system that is universally
reviled by foreign investors. See, e.g., id. at 1063.
180. Foreign governments face pressure not only from the United States, but also from
their own financial institutions, which sought to alleviate legal uncertainties and economic
pressures on themselves by working to ensure uniform application of the U.S. regime under
the supervision and sanction of their governments. For a discussion, see Christians, supra
note 23, at 32-35.
181. Much of the concern within the United States focused on whether California’s
regime interfered with US foreign commerce and foreign policy interests. UNITARY TAX
GROUP REPORT, supra note 163, at 1047 (quoting Treasury Secretary Regan that “the effects
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claimed jurisdiction was extraterritorial in scope and incompatible with
global legal standards.182 Accordingly, the potential international law vio-
lations were not ultimately addressed by any courts. Similar issues arising
today in the case of global enforcement of citizenship-based taxation on
non-U.S. residents are, in contrast, largely being neglected by the interna-
tional community and left to the courts to adjudicate. Since judicial inter-
vention is a costly and time-consuming process, it is at least worthwhile
considering whether there are incremental reforms that would alleviate
the harms currently being inflicted in service of citizenship-based taxation
by FATCA.
D. Incremental Reform
In many respects, and perhaps surprisingly, the main faults of citizen-
ship-based tax could be easily remedied by legislators and in some cases
administrators.183 But such action would require discarding some heavy
emotional baggage surrounding fairness, patriotism, and migration in a po-
litical climate that is likely too frail to sustain radical reform. As a result,
incremental steps are necessary to move citizenship-based taxation toward
the customary law principles of residence and source jurisdiction.
This requires, at minimum, a rational approach by the United States
to clearly define citizenship for tax purposes within the U.S. Person cate-
gory. It is absurd to condition compliance with the tax law on the individ-
ual’s prior consultation with an immigration attorney whose ultimate
assessment may not even bring certainty without the intervention of a
wholly distinct federal agency. Simply put, clearly defining the taxpayer is
the responsibility of the state that seeks to impose the category — not the
individual so characterized and certainly not a third party, be it a private
sector financial intermediary or a foreign government. To hold otherwise
is to subject individuals to a gross unfairness of uncertainty that can only
be resolved by engaging counsel in two fields of law in another country.
of the use of the worldwide unitary method may interfere with the foreign commerce of the
United States, so this becomes a matter of vital federal interest.”).
182. California’s officials and members of the business community preferred a negoti-
ated outcome obtained by consensus to a hierarchically imposed solution. UNITARY TAX
GROUP REPORT, supra note 163, at 1047 (stating that “[t]he decision on federal legislation
reflected a shared view by both the state and business members of the Working Group that a
cooperative voluntary approach based on consensus offered the best choice of obtaining a
solution to the difficult problems before the Group”); Statement of James R. Thompson,
reprinted in UNITARY TAX GROUP REPORT, supra note 163, at 1066 (“This is a responsible
effort to make sure that state tax policies will be conducive to harmonious international eco-
nomic relations.”).
183. Perhaps less straight-forwardly, U.S. courts could choose to step in (especially in
regards to the plight of Accidental Americans) by inverting the reasoning put forth in the
case of Lucienne D’Hotelle, which left room for a future court to prevent citizenship-based
taxation on equity grounds in cases involving nonresident citizens who do not know about or
voluntarily accept their status as U.S. citizens. United States v. Lucienne D’Hotelle De Benitez
Rexach, 558 F.2d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 1977) (stating that judicial precedent supporting citizenship-
based taxation might “shift markedly” were it “used to compel payment of taxes by all per-
sons who mistakenly thought themselves to have been validly expatriated”).
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Tax law scholars uniformly agree that justice in taxation demands
equal treatment of equally-resourced taxpayers and different treatment of
differently-resourced taxpayers.184 But, any justice inquiry is futile until
the threshold category of taxpayer is defined in a principled way.185 If the
state cannot explain and defend its own categories, it is difficult to see why
the state should nevertheless be justified in applying rules and exacting
punishment for noncompliance. Further, it is unclear why other states
should accede to demands backed by sanction to apply such an injustice to
their own nationals and residents.  Clearly defining what the law requires,
including from whom it demands compliance, are the responsibility of the
lawmaker, not the subject of the law, and not a third party.
To know one’s status as a U.S. citizen, and to understand the tax con-
sequences that flow from that status, is to access a complex common law
regime that is as deep and mysterious to the outsider as the tax law is to
those not passionately dedicated to mastery of the subject. Both systems
are sufficiently complex that a person who draws conclusions without ex-
tensive research, and preferably the advice of counsel in both fields, is
almost certain to make mistakes, some with serious consequences.
Yet, FATCA is currently compelling millions of individuals to draw
just such conclusions. Moreover, it is compelling them to do so instantly or
face adverse consequences including heavy financial penalties and loss of
basic financial services. Finally, it is doing so for the purpose of exposing
such persons to retroactive tax compliance obligations and penalties.
For individuals around the world currently discovering their potential
citizenship like Tina did, by virtue of a letter of inquiry and demand from
their local community bank, this outcome is disastrous and seems unjust.
Never having availed themselves of the benefits of U.S. citizenship, igno-
rant of the increasing obligations tied to their status, they have no oppor-
tunity for withdrawal from U.S. citizenship without both retroactive tax
compliance and payment of significant exit fees.186 FATCA was arguably
enacted with good intentions, namely, to make the tax system more fair. In
the implementation, however, FATCA instead introduces unfairness to
184. See generally TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE (Joseph J. Thorndike & Den-
nis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002) (explaining the distinct theories of like treatment of equally-
resourced taxpayers as horizontal equity and different treatment of differently-resourced tax-
payers as vertical equity and analyzing these concepts as the normative foundations of just
taxation); see also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in
International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX
REV. 299, 301-15 (2001) (discussing horizontal and vertical equity in the international con-
text); Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 L. & POL’Y
INT’L BUS. 145, 153 (1998) (same); Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on
the Benefit, Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. 399, 400, 461 (2005)
(examining the notions of horizontal and vertical equity as key elements of taxation in accor-
dance with ability to pay, and why ability to pay is a normatively justified rationale for taxa-
tion while benefits theory fails to satisfy normative requirements).
185. See Christians, Drawing the Boundaries, supra note 50, at 53, 57.
186. I.R.C. §§ 877(a)(2)(c); 877A(g)(3); 7701(a)(50) (2014).
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many: a “gotcha” with life-altering financial impact on a population that is
invisible in most discussions about the normative goals of taxation.187
Citizenship-based taxation thus seems, at minimum, susceptible to
mistake-making on a massive scale. At worst, it seems designed to create
conditions for injustice. A series of scenarios now exist under which the
United States ought to offer to Accidental Americans both an explanation
of the consequences of continuing U.S. citizenship and a one-time option
to start over or, in the extreme, to exit the status all together, without
penalty and with minimum compliance costs.
The need for explanation and opt-out are an unfortunate and undesir-
able outcome of adherence to the fundamentally flawed policy of taxing
on the basis of citizenship in an increasingly globalized economy. Allowing
a “fresh start” without penalty—including an opportunity to restructure
financial investments to avoid owning assets that run afoul of penalty and
interest regimes designed to disgorge all returns—would be an appropri-
ate minimum response to the pleas of Accidental Americans.
The best approach is obviously to abandon taxation on the basis of
legal status alone and rely on the existing alternatives in use by the United
States and the rest of the world, namely, residence and source. But, if the
United States insists on continuing to tax on the basis of legal status, ex-
planation, fresh start, and opt-outs are critical components to ensure jus-
tice is possible in the implementation.
The proper time for the United States to identify its citizens as a juris-
dictional matter, and to inform this population of their obligations, arises
when official determinations are made by the U.S government itself with
respect to the rights citizens hold to the exclusion of others.  Registration
to vote in an election and issuance of a passport are two likely candi-
dates.188 An adult seeking a current U.S. passport knows she is a citizen
187. Christians, Drawing the Boundaries, supra note 50, at 72-74.
188. The fact that a parent can obtain a passport on behalf of a child necessitates a
second condition with respect to passports that the individual be able to comprehend the
consequences of her actions. This would align the acknowledgement of citizenship with the
termination thereof, pursuant to immigration and nationality laws that prohibit anyone from
expatriating unless they are an adult that is capable of understanding citizenship as a status
and the consequences of renouncing or relinquishing that status. See supra note 83. Not ap-
plying this same rule to the acquisition of citizenship itself presents a particular injustice in
the case of an individual who has developmental or cognitive difficulties that prevents mean-
ingful understanding of citizenship and thus prevents termination of status. Under current
law, such a person is permanently bound to the United States and cannot exit the nationality.
This situation appears to violate the fundamental right that all humans have to change their
nationality. See G.A. Res. 217 (III)(A)(15)(2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec.
10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights] (“No one shall be . . . denied
the right to change his nationality.”). The right to expatriate was first recognized by Congress
in 1868. Preamble to the Act of July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 223 (1868) (“[T]he right of expatriation
is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”); see also WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note
83, ch. 12-1; BEN-PORATH, supra note 83, at 107-08. To my knowledge, the United States has
never been challenged for violating this rule to date. However, a grassroots group of nonresi-
dent citizens has filed a claim at the United Nations that includes this issue among its charges.
Human Rights Complaint on Behalf of All U.S. Persons Abroad Has Now Been Submitted,
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because she has asked for and received official verification of that status
from the United States itself. Beyond that, the analysis quickly
deteriorates.189
The implications for citizenship-based taxation are clear: it should not
be the job of an individual to identify herself as a U.S. Person for tax
purposes by virtue of a citizenship conferred upon her.190 If, like Tina, one
is not known to the United States to be a citizen because she has never
sought that recognition, she should not be subjected to retroactive taxa-
tion and information reporting compliance obligations, to penalties, or to a
fee to exit. Instead, she should be left alone. Without official recognition
of her status as a citizen, the United States Embassy is not coming to her
rescue, she receives no services, she has no right to entry, and she is not in
any meaningful way a U.S. Person.
Conversely, if she makes herself known by applying for recognition of
that status, the United States may apply its extraordinary tax and informa-
tion reporting obligations attending to that status, but only on a prospec-
tive basis, and only on condition that it meaningfully informs her of these
obligations.  Taxpayer education is key to proper and fair administration
of the tax laws and to ensuring that individuals cooperate with the tax
authority.191 When the tax jurisdiction is global, taxpayers are entitled to
global notification and outreach by the tax authority.192
The taxation of individuals solely on the basis of a citizenship that they
have no absolute right to decline seems beyond justification under any
normative theory. But even if citizenship-based taxation can be justified, it
must, at minimum, depend on the informed consent of the subject, cou-
pled with the opportunity to decline membership without penalty or fee.
The imposition of a fee to renounce expressly appears to violate the fun-
damental right that everyone has to leave their nationality.193 To date, no
prospective renunciant has yet challenged the U.S. Department of State in
its attempt to impose this fee as a condition to expatriation. Such a chal-
lenge would be appropriate.
ISAAC BROCK SOC’Y (May 21, 2015), http://isaacbrocksociety.ca/2014/07/28/human-rights-
complaint-on-behalf-of-all-u-s-persons-abroad-has-now-been-submitted/.
189. This does not solve the systemic under-inclusion of birthright citizens born abroad,
naturalized citizens, and legal permanent residents. There does not appear to be a ready
solution to this problem.
190. Contra, e.g., BOLL, supra note 43, at 293 (stating that “[t]he reality of multiple
nationality emphasizes that it is the individual who has to beware of being subject to the
requirements of more than one state. Should more states decide to tax their nationals’ in-
come on the basis of nationality, for example, one might imagine that many multiple nation-
als would choose to renounce multiple nationality in favour of single nationality”). However,
in making this claim, Boll does not consider the significance of ambiguity and ignorance as to
citizenship status nor the role of conditions limiting the right to renounce including prior tax
compliance, payment of fees, and the mental capacity of the renunciant.
191. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 51, 55
(2013).
192. See Christians, Regulating Tax Preparers, supra note 120, at 391.
193. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 188.
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Of course, there will be those who seek to abuse the tax system
through artifice—that is true no matter the design or intentions. But that
is not an excuse to violate basic principles of justice and fairness for a
global population of essentially innocent victims of an antiquated and ill-
administered policy.
Accordingly, citizenship-based taxation appears to require a fresh
start approach, and a one-time opt-opt out for nonresident citizens, at the
very least in the case of those who obtained citizenship by birth. This is an
extreme and unfortunate result for a failed policy. Possibly it is better than
the alternative: continued enforcement by all the world of a policy that
violates international law as well as basic principles of justice. Unwilling
citizens, including those who have never sought a passport for themselves,
should not be forced into U.S. fiscal citizenship.
CONCLUSION
The United States is engaged in a project to dramatically expand the
enforcement of its tax jurisdiction over a globally dispersed population,
after a century of neglect and apparent indifference. It is currently doing
so with the acquiescence and assistance of other countries. But other coun-
tries should not submit to this flawed policy. Instead they should acknowl-
edge that it deviates from fundamental international tax norms and
virtually universal practices, it violates the core international law principle
of nonintervention, and it compels states to visit unnecessary harms upon
their own populations.
Failing to meaningfully identify its global taxpayer population and ex-
plain its extraterritorial claims over their financial lives, the United States
cannot reasonably impose its jurisdiction upon nonresidents from afar; it
certainly should not expect the world to unquestioningly assist it in this
extraordinary task. By relying on individuals themselves to know how they
are defined in U.S. law and to understand the consequences of that defini-
tion, citizenship-based taxation, enforced by FATCA’s self-certification
system, violates the taxpayer’s right to know what the law is. The result is
arbitrary exposure and punishment of some individuals who might in real-
ity have no substantive connection to the United States, while purpose-
fully neglecting others who do, all at the hands of foreign institutions and
foreign governments. The probability and the consequences for systemic
error in both false positives and false negatives is a regulatory quagmire,
while objectionable as a matter of fundamental legitimacy in lawmaking.
Finally, the enabling of citizenship-based taxation via FATCA is sim-
ply incompatible with the fundamental principles of residence and source,
concepts so integral to the international tax law system that they have
come to be understood by globally respected academics as expressions of
customary law. There are ready alternatives for the United States to exer-
cise its power to tax nonresidents consistent with how virtually all other
countries interpret the limits of their respective taxing jurisdictions. Incre-
mental changes could move the United States in the direction of the rest
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of the world, toward principles that are capable of being enforced without
unduly interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.
However, the world need not wait for the United States to make nec-
essary reforms. Citizenship-based taxation is inconsistent with interna-
tional tax law principles, and FATCA as applied to non-U.S. residents is a
violation of the international principle of nonintervention. States need not
acquiesce to these deviations from the global consensus and in violation of
international law; instead, they may reasonably refuse to apply FATCA to
their own resident populations. Indeed, there is a ready template for how
states should behave toward the United States, in the OECD’s common
reporting standard for tax information gathering and exchange. This stan-
dard adopts a global version of FATCA that is compatible with and based
on the fundamental international tax law principles of residence and
source. Consistent with the practice of the rest of the world, the common
reporting standard could be applied on the basis of residence and source
to the United States in the same manner as all other countries have ac-
cepted it.
Given the potential for abuse of basic rights that occurs when a state
dispenses punishment despite excusable ignorance, no other state should
be willing to assist in effectuating the injustice that must follow from the
U.S. effort to tax nonresidents on a worldwide basis. The international
community would be justified to, at minimum, insist that the United States
catalogue its own taxpayer population, inform this population of its status,
and educate it of the attendant obligations, before turning to other coun-
tries to assist in the task. Cataloguing and informing should take place
through deliberate expressions of consent to be governed, such as the issu-
ance of a passport or the registration to vote from abroad. Relatedly, the
tax system is global; so too must be the administration’s education efforts
and guidance as to the interpretation of the law in all of the circumstances
it purports to regulate.
Finally, there seems to be little alternative but to allow nonresident
birthright citizens to opt out of their citizenship without penalty and with-
out administrative hassle. The extraordinary tax claims made by the
United States upon its citizens at the very least implies that those who
obtain that status without their informed consent have an absolute right to
exit. Upon learning of their status and the obligations attendant thereto,
these citizens must be entitled to leave without being compelled to pro-
duce paperwork, engage in interviews, endure punishment for past tax or
information reporting noncompliance, or pay a fee, as current law re-
quires. To demand otherwise is to engage in the kind of action the Ameri-
can colonies themselves once labeled as tyranny and viewed as intolerable.
No other state should be compelled under economic pressure to facilitate
such a regime.
